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I INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a very great pleasure to be able to deliver the 2005 WA Lee lecture. There are many 
reasons in my own mind which led me to accept the invitation to deliver the lecture. 
Together with Professor Myles McGregor-Lowndes, I was involved in the 
establishment of this lecture in recognition of the contribution made by Tony Lee to 
Equity and Trusts as a teacher scholar and law reformer. I have to say that the idea to 
establish the lecture came from Myles although I was happy to be involved in the 
establishment and administration of the lecture having worked with Tony for many 
years as a colleague in the law school at the University of Queensland. I was in fact 
taught Equity and Trusts by Tony in 1973 or perhaps it was 1974. 
 
During the time that I worked in the Law School at the University of Queensland, Tony 
and Professor Harold Ford of the University of Melbourne, published the first edition of 
what has become the leading Australian work on the Principles of the Law of Trusts, 
new editions of which continue to appear regularly. It is generally acknowledged that 
Tony has also made a very significant and enlightened contribution to the reform of 
Trusts and Succession Laws in Australia.  I hope therefore that this lecture will serve as 
a fitting tribute to these and other contributions which Tony has made as teacher scholar 
and law reformer.  
 
This lecture is intended to provide a brief glimpse of some of the themes which I have 
been examining in the course of writing a new book on Equitable Obligations: Duties, 
Remedies and Defences which is scheduled to be published by Thomson Legal and 
Regulatory in 2006. The focus of the new work is on liabilities and remedies for breach 
of trust and breach of fiduciary duty and hence, I have decided to talk about some 
aspects of the developments which have occurred in relation to those aspects of 
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equitable relief. The focus will be on Australian developments in the context of 
comparative perspectives drawn from developments in the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and Canada. I would also like to add that the focus of the lecture is concerned 
with how the courts deal with the question of how a fiduciary (including a trustee) ought 
to act and what the courts will do in the event that the fiduciary has not acted as he 
ought to have acted. This requires an examination of the moral qualities of the 
fiduciary’s actions which is manifested in terms of the fiduciary’s obligation of loyalty 
requiring the adherence to a selfless standard of behaviour rather then self-interested 
behaviour. Other standards of conduct are also considered when assessing the moral 
quality of the fiduciary’s behaviour. So I will begin by reflecting on developments 
which have occurred in relation to the fiduciary’s obligation of loyalty. 
 
II DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO LIABILITIES FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
AND BREACH OF TRUST 
 
[201] Developments in relation to a fiduciary’s obligation of loyalty 
It has traditionally been accepted by Australian and English authorities that when the 
characteristics which give rise to a fiduciary relationship are present, that the feature 
which marks the fiduciary out for special scrutiny is the obligation of loyalty which is 
reflected in various facets, the most important of which is the duty to avoid a conflict of 
duty and interest and the duty not to misuse the fiduciary position without the fully 
informed consent of the beneficiary.  These are simply facets or different aspects of the 
core duties of loyalty and fidelity which entitles the beneficiary to the single minded 
loyalty of the fiduciary. What lies at the heart of the fiduciary obligation is a standard of 
conduct and that standard is one which requires the fiduciary to act selflessly and with 
undivided loyalty in the interests of the other party. It is a very high standard, the effect 
of which is to limit the way in which the fiduciary may use a discretion or power over 
another party. The fiduciary must only have regard to the interests of the other party so 
that the self interest of the fiduciary has to give way to the interests of the beneficiary.1
 
The operation and the determination of liabilities of a fiduciary based on conflict of duty 
and interest or a misuse of a fiduciary position in a wide variety of fiduciary contexts is 
well established and documented in terms of the requirements which have to be 
satisfied. However, in more recent cases the courts have been called upon to consider 
whether there are other duties embraced within the framework of the fiduciary’s 
obligations of loyalty and fidelity and in particular whether there is scope for subjecting 
the fiduciary to other more positive duties.  The courts have been called upon to 
consider the extent to which it might be justifiable to invoke the fiduciary standard to 
regulate new situations in the interests of justice. Here, it is useful to compare the 
approach that currently prevails in Australia with that which has found support in some 
Canadian cases.  
 
In Australia, the fiduciary standard can only be invoked to protect particular economic 
interests and the High Court of Australia has not been prepared to countenance 
intervention on the basis of a fiduciary relationship to provide an independent source of 
positive duties to create new forms of civil wrongs outside of the law of contract and 
tort.   The court has only been prepared to recognise proscriptive obligations not to 
 
1  For an explanation of the obligation of loyalty as the distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary see  
Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1997] 2 WLR 436, 448 (Millett  LJ). 
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obtain an unauthorised benefit from the relationship and not to be in a position of 
conflict, and it has resisted the imposition of positive legal duties on the fiduciary to act 
in the interests of the person to whom the duty is owed.  Thus, for example, in the 
context of the relationship of doctor and patient, the court has only been prepared to 
recognise proscriptive obligations and has declined to allow the fiduciary standard to 
provide the basis for an obligation on a doctor to provide a patient with access to 
medical records. The proscriptive obligations prohibit the fiduciary from engaging in 
certain kinds of activities without imposing any positive duties to act and the obligations 
which affect the fiduciary do not prescribe either the content of what is legal conduct or 
the means by which the beneficiary’s interests are to be protected.  In Australia, the 
conflict and profit rules are considered to represent the hallmark of the fiduciary’s duty 
of loyalty. The fiduciary can be made to account for benefits and make good losses on 
the basis of these rules but cannot otherwise incur liabilities which stem from the 
imposition of positive legal duties to act in the interest of the person to whom the duty is 
owed.2 It is therefore still necessary in Australia to plead cases in which relief is 
claimed on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty by pleading facts which demonstrate a 
breach of the conflict or profit rules. 
 
In other jurisdictions, particularly in North America the courts have imposed positive 
duties to disclose information to beneficiaries about matters which affect the interests of 
the beneficiary, and in Canada some judges have sought to invoke fiduciary obligations 
as a basis for enabling patients to have access to medical records held by doctors. Such 
an approach involves an expansion of the types of interests that fiduciary law is invoked 
to protect so as to include not only economic interests but also individual and social 
interests particularly in relation to vulnerable and disadvantaged classes of people, 
including indigenous peoples. In McInery v Macdonald3 it was decided that the 
relationship of physician and patient gave rise to a duty to make proper disclosure to the 
patient on the basis of an assumption that the information conveyed to the doctor 
remained the information of the patient and is held in a fashion akin to a trust. The onus 
was placed on the physician to justify denial of access to the information. 
 
The judgment of McLachlin J in the case of Norberg v Wynrib4 is also of interest in this 
context. There it was accepted that fiduciary duties are not confined to the exercise of 
power which can affect the legal interests of the beneficiary but also encompasses ‘the 
beneficiary’s non-legal interests or practical interests’.5 Under this approach, fiduciary 
obligations are not confined to matters such as confidentiality, conflict of duty and 
interest and under influence. The obligations may extend to protecting societal and 
practical interests, and justified a finding  in that instance that a  breach of duty occurred 
when a doctor took advantage of a patient, dependent on drugs for sexual favours. 
Particular importance was attached to the power of the physician and the vulnerability 
of the patient, as giving rise to a fiduciary relationship. Under this analysis, the fiduciary 
standard is capable of assuming a new dimension of protecting ‘fundamental human and 
                                                 
2  This paragraph is based on the reasoning of the High Court in Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 
71. See also Fico v O’Leary [2004] WASC 215, [156]; Bell Group Ltd (In Liq) v Westpac Banking 
Corporation [2001] WASC 315, [191-2] (Owen J). It may be that a similar approach prevails in 
New Zealand see S v Attorney-General [2003] NZCA 149. 
3  (1992) 93 DLR (4th) 415. 
4  (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449. 
5  Norberg v Wynrib (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 449 at 490-1. 
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personal interests’.6 This provided the passport to relief in the form of damages ‘to 
protect the plaintiff’s interest in receiving medical care free from exploitation at the 
hands of the fiduciary’.7
[202] Developments in relation to the identification of a fiduciary relationship 
The application of the fiduciary standard is dependent upon the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship. In many instances the existence of such a relationship will not pose any 
great difficulties particularly if the relationship is one of the well established fiduciary 
relationships. In this lecture, attention will focus on the developments which have 
occurred in relation to the issue of what scope exists for fiduciary duties to arise  in the 
context of a more extensive range of relationship and it will be suggested that on the 
basis of recent developments in relation to the criteria which have to be satisfied to 
establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship, that there is considerable scope for 
fiduciary duties to arise in the context of a more extensive range of relationships, 
including a broad range of professional advisory relationships. Perhaps the most 
significant development in relation to the criteria for establishing the existence of such a 
relationship, is the emergence of what may conveniently be referred to as the reasonable 
expectation test.  
 
The courts have declined to adopt any comprehensive definition of who is a fiduciary 
and have left open the possibility that such a relationship might arise in an infinite 
variety of circumstances. Key factors singled out in the leading Australian High Court 
authorities have been a position of disadvantage or vulnerability on the part of one of 
the parties, which causes him or her to place reliance on the other, and an undertaking to 
act for or on behalf of, or in the interests of the another in the exercise of a power that 
will affect the interests of that other in a legal and practical sense.8 For many years, the 
focus in the Australian cases has therefore been on finding on the basis of the particular 
facts of the case, an undertaking to act on behalf of another in some particular matter or 
matters. It may be that there is greater scope for such an undertaking to be found on the 
basis of a reasonable expectation. Finn J in his more recent judicial and extra judicial 
writings on fiduciary obligations has brought this test to the forefront of the 
requirements, which have to be satisfied to establish a fiduciary relationship. The 
approach is one, which requires the establishment of a reasonable expectation on the 
part of one party, to the relationship that the other will act in the interests of that party 
and not in the interests of himself or herself or the interests of some third party. The 
expectation must be such that the fiduciary must act not merely having regard to the 
other party’s interests, but must act solely and selflessly in the interests of the 
beneficiary.9 Under this approach, it would seem that there is greater scope for a 
fiduciary obligation to arise because it encompasses situations in which someone has 
either undertaken to act in the interests of another, as well as situations in which there is 
a legitimate expectation that such an undertaking has arisen.10
 
 
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Hospital Products Limited  v United Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41. 
9  ASC v AS Nominees Ltd  (1995) 62 FCR 504, 521;  P Finn, ‘Fiduciary Reflections’ Paper presented 
at 13 Commonwealth Law Conference, Melbourne, Australia, Sunday 13 April  – Thursday 17 
April, 2003. 
10  Woodson Sales Pty Ltd v Woodson (Australia) Pty Ltd [1996] NSW Lexis 3758, [73]. 
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In both New Zealand11 and Canada, some judges have opted to determine the issue as to 
the existence of a fiduciary relationship, by application of a reasonable expectation test 
that a party would act in the best interests of the other party. Those who adopt this 
approach usually have regard to a non-exhaustive list of evidential factors including 
influence, vulnerability and trust without regarding vulnerability as a necessary 
ingredient for the existence of such a relationship.12 Other judges have dissented from 
this view, and adopted a more restrictive approach. Instead, vulnerability has been 
singled out as the distinguishing characteristic so that the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship requires a determination as to whether one party is dependent upon the 
power of another. One party has to have unilateral power over another’s affairs, placing 
the latter at the mercy of the former’s discretion.13
 
Under the reasonable expectation approach there is scope for fiduciary obligations to 
arise in a commercial setting and for them to arise as the consequence of the contract 
and the terms of the contract in a particular business setting. Under this approach, the 
obligations will arise when it is necessary to give effect to the expectations which the 
parties properly entertain of each other, in consequence of the contract and its terms 
within the particular business setting. Findings may be made that self interest is required 
to be subordinated to acting in the best interests of the other, in some or all matters 
which are the subject matter of the agreement. On the other hand, such findings will not 
be open if that will distort the arrangement which has been entered into by the parties. 
The contract may be the source of the fiduciary duty, as for example, it is in the case of 
agency and partnership, as well as providing the foundation for the modification of the 
extent and nature of the duties owed in the particular case.14
 
It is possible to make a few brief observations about some of the contexts which are 
occurring in which fiduciary duties are from time to time found to have arisen outside of 
the well established presumptive relationships, on the basis of the particular 
circumstances surrounding the relationship between the parties. The most commonly 
recurring situations which have arisen in recent years are those which have involved 
various kinds of professional advisers (including financial advisers) and their clients, 
other than lawyers and their clients, although as will be made apparent in a moment, 
lawyers and their clients also figure very prominently in the cases. In such instances 
whether or not the obligation of loyalty has arisen will depend upon whether the 
requirements of proof discussed earlier have been satisfied for proof that the 
relationship is in fact fiduciary. Accountants15 have been found to incur fiduciary 
obligations, as have stockbrokers when undertaking an advisory role in relation to 
investments,16 or where there is an expectation that the adviser will act in the interests 
of  the customer in providing advice as to the wisdom of proposed investments.  
Potentially many kinds of financial service relationships are open to scrutiny, including 
banks when they come to occupy the position of an investment adviser.17 Under the 
                                                 
11  DHL International (NZ) Ltd v Richmond Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 10, 23 (Richardson J). 
12  Lac Minerals v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th) 14, 40 (La Forest J); 
Hodgkinson v Simms (1994)117 DLR (4th) 161, 178-9 (La Forest J). 
13  Hodgkinson v Simms (1994) 117 DLR (4th) 161, 219  (Sopinka and MacLachlin JJ). 
14  Hospital Products International Pty Ltd v United Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, where 
differing views were expressed as to the desirability of extending fiduciary duties to a commercial 
context. 
15  Henderson v Amadio No 1 (1995) 62 FCR 1. 
16  Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 37. 
17  Commonwealth Bank v  Smith (1991) 42 FCR 390. 
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approach based on the reasonable expectation of the client, such findings are open 
irrespective of the level of sophistication of the customer or the ability of the customer 
to accept or reject the advice. It does not require a total assumption of power by the 
adviser or total reliance of the client on the adviser.18
 
[203] Developments in relation to claims for breach of fiduciary duty against 
professional advisers 
There has been a lot of litigation in recent years against lawyers, accountants and 
various financial advisers by claimants seeking to establish entitlement to relief on the 
basis of a breach of fiduciary duty. For the purpose of this lecture, the main focus will 
be on the operation of fiduciary duties in relation to lawyers, although some brief 
comments will also be made in relation to application of fiduciary duties in claims 
brought against financial advisers.  
 
It is generally assumed that a solicitor is subject to the usual obligations of fidelity and 
loyalty owed by fiduciaries generally. Manifestations of this include; the duty to 
preserve the confidentiality of information received as a consequence of the solicitor 
client relationship and not to disclose such information without the client’s fully 
informed consent; to avoid conflicts of duty and interest; to account for unauthorised 
profits; and to avoid any actual conflict between the duty to serve the interests of one 
client and the duty to serve the interests of another client.19 It is the latter duty which 
has been gaining increasing prominence in two situations, one of which is commonly 
described as the simultaneous representation of clients in the same matter, sometimes 
referred to as same matter conflicts, and the other which is commonly referred to as 
successive representation in separate matters. In the first, the fiduciary acts for separate 
clients in the same matter and in the second, the fiduciary has on an earlier occasion 
acquired information which is relevant to another matter in respect of which the 
fiduciary is now acting for a different client. It is now necessary to offer some 
explanation as to the current state of the authorities in Australia and in other 
jurisdictions in relation to both aspects of this duty. 
 
At the moment there is no leading High Court authority in relation to simultaneous 
representation of clients in the same matter, although there have been a number of cases 
in which both State and Federal judges have enunciated some relevant principles in 
relation to this matter. Those authorities do not go so far as to prohibit a solicitor from 
acting for more than one party, even in instances where the solicitor is also one of the 
parties to the transaction so as to raise issues not only of conflict of duty but also 
conflict of duty and interest. However, it is repeatedly asserted that the solicitor must 
avoid any conflict between the duty to serve the interests of one client and the duty to 
serve the interests of another client. In part, the intervention of the court will depend 
upon whether the solicitor has obtained the ‘unfettered consent of all the relevant clients 
after fully disclosing all the material facts, or the duty is attenuated by contract, with 
relevant client’s fully informed consent’.20 However, the obligation of the solicitor does 
 
18  For a Canadian example of a fiduciary relationship found to have arisen in a financial advisory 
context see Hodgkinson v Simms (1994) 117 DLR (4th) 161; see also Aequitas v AEFC [2001] 
NSWSC 14, where Austin J found that a fiduciary relationship had arisen as a result of a joint 
venture holding itself out as having expertise in advising and undetaking through their agent to 
provide corporate advice. 
19  Maguire v Makaronis (1996) 188 CLR 449, 495 (Kirby J). 
20  Marron v J. Chatham Daunt Pty Ltd BC970123 (Byrne J). 
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not cease at that stage, as the solicitor must be constantly vigilant and alert to perceive 
the possible emergence of a conflict of interest not only between the clients but also 
between the client and the solicitor. It is generally acknowledged that situations can 
arise in which it is impossible for the solicitor to act fairly and adequately for both 
parties, even if there has been informed consent. The courts will readily intervene if 
there have been failures by the solicitor to properly inform a particular client when in 
possession of information material to the client’s interests. Significant material non-
disclosures and conflict of interests on the part of the solicitor such as close family and 
commercial ties with one of the clients will also establish a claim for relief.21
 
There are perhaps more instructive authorities to be found in other jurisdictions. The 
relevant principles were explored by the Privy Council in an appeal from New Zealand 
in Clarke Boyce v Mouat.22 There it was accepted that a solicitor can act with informed 
consent which is required not only in order to be able to act for both parties, but it is 
also required whenever a conflict of interest or a real possibility of a conflict arises in 
the course of so acting. The establishment of an informed consent is dependent upon the 
solicitor demonstrating not only that each party has consented to the solicitor acting for 
both parties, but also demonstrating when a conflict has arisen, that there has been such 
disclosure that the client appreciates that the solicitor is acting under a disability and the 
consequences of not receiving proper advice. Consequently, a solicitor will be in breach 
of duty if he or she acts for both parties in the transaction without disclosing this to one 
of them, and even if this is disclosed, the solicitor will also be in breach if the solicitor 
fails unbeknown to one party, to disclose to that party material facts relative to the other 
of which he or she is aware. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the obligations of a fiduciary who acts for more than one party 
have been formulated with even more stringency by Millett LJ in Bristol and West 
Building Society v Mothew.23 There it is accepted that a solicitor may not act for two 
principals without the informed consent of both principals, and that a solicitor must also 
‘take care not to find himself in an actual conflict of duty so that he cannot fulfil his 
obligations to one principal without failing in his obligation to another’.24  The solicitor 
may be left with no alternative other than to cease to act for one and preferably both. In 
addition, Millett LJ also stated that: ‘even if a solicitor is properly acting for two 
principals, the solicitor must act in good faith in the interests of each and must not act 
with the intention of furthering the interest of one principal to the prejudice of the 
other’.25 Liability here depends on intentional conduct, although it need not be 
dishonest. It should also be noted that in the United Kingdom, the obligation to avoid 
conflicts of duty may not be limited to conflicts in relation to the same transaction, but 
may also extend to instances in which there is some reasonable relationship between the 
two matters.26
 
                                                 
21  Stewart v Layton (1992) 111 ALR 687; Wan v McDonald [1992] 105 ALR 687. 
22  [1994] 1 AC 428. 
23  [1997] 2 WLR 436. See also Moody v Cox [1917] 2 Ch 71, 81. 
24  Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1007] 2 WLR 436, 450.  
25  Ibid. 
26  Marks & Spencer Plc v Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer [2004] 1 WLR 2331, 2335 (Lawrence 
Collins J). See also Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood [2005] 1 WLR 567, in which the House of 
Lords affirmed the strictness of the fiduciary standards in a case of conflicting duties by a solicitor. 
However, the House of Lords dealt with the case on the basis that the fiduciary prohibition of a 
conflict of duty and duty was incorporated into the retainer. 
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There is also now, a considerable body of authority in relation to the circumstances 
under which a solicitor may act against a former client and under what circumstances 
injunctive relief may be available to restrain a solicitor from acting against a former 
client. In Australia, as yet, there is no authoritative statement of the applicable principles 
by the High Court. A diversity of approaches have been adopted by State and Federal 
judges when called upon to deal with this issue, and intervention has been based on 
three possible grounds, namely, a duty of loyalty owed to the former client expressed in 
terms of conflict of duty and interest, the protection of confidential information and the 
court’s control over the conduct of solicitors as officers of the court.27 It is necessary to 
make some comments about each of these grounds.  Although, in a number of the cases, 
both conflict of interest and preventing the disclosure of confidential information are 
identified as closely related grounds, the principles and findings are usually stated in 
terms of a there being a real and sensible possibility of confidential information being 
used.28 However, there are also statements to the effect that a conflict can arise simply 
because the advancement of the case of a new client will prejudice the interest of a 
former client, and some judges have gone so far as to suggest that only in rare and very 
special cases could a solicitor properly be permitted to act against the former client 
whether or not there is any real question that the use of confidential information could 
arise.29 In addition, some cases have been decided on the basis that the solicitor’s duty 
to the court is such as to prevent the solicitor from acting, and even although there may 
be no breach of fiduciary duty or likelihood of the misuse of confidential information.30 
The need for the objective appearance of independence on the part of the solicitor has 
been stressed. 
 
In some of the cases which have been dealt with on the basis of preventing a disclosure 
of confidential information, a strict approach has been adopted so as to not too readily 
allow a solicitor to act in a matter adverse to the interests of the old client. The courts 
have endeavoured to guard against disclosures of confidential information that will be 
of disadvantage to the former client and to guard against subconsciously drawing on the 
information. The courts will consider whether there is a real risk of the disclosure of 
confidential information, both conscious and unconscious, although, the possibility of 
real mischief must be proved.  It is necessary to prove that the information was 
confidential to the plaintiff when it was communicated and that it should be kept 
confidential and secret.31 The courts have not accepted the approach adopted in an early 
Queensland case, that the interest of the previous client should prevail if there is any 
evidence of communication of confidential information,32 and nor have the courts been 
prepared to introduce an irrebuttable presumption that a prior retainer has resulted in the 
acquisition of confidential information.33 In general, the courts in Australia have not 
been prepared to place much reliance on arrangements such as the utilisation of 
 
27  Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 501; [2001] VSCA 0248, [52]; Newman as 
Trustee for the estates of Littlejohn v Phillips Fox (a firm)  [1999] WASC 171. 
28  Malleson Stephen Jaques v KPMG Peat Marwick (1991) 4 WAR 357, 360 (Ipp J); Oceanic v HIH 
[1999] NSWSC 292. 
29  Wan v McDonald [1992] 105 ALR 473, 494. 
30  T and I [2001] Fam CA 351. 
31  For a very full analysis of these issues see the judgment of Drummond J in Carindale Country 
Club Estate Pty Ltd v Astill (1993) 42 FCR 307; see also D& J Constructions Pty Ltd v Head and 
others trading as Clayton Utz (1987) 9 NSWLR 118, 122 (Bryson J). 
32  Mills v Day Dawn Block Gold Mining Company Limited (1882) QLJ 62. 
33  Such an approach found favour with Gummow J in National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v The Sentry 
Corporation (1989) 22 FCR 209, 230. 
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undertakings and Chinese walls, and the onus has in some cases been placed on the 
recipient to prove the absence of any defined risk, as the only workable approach having 
regard to the large size of modern law firms.34
 
A brief comparison of the above approach with that endorsed in the United Kingdom 
and Canada provides some useful comparative perspectives. In Prince Jefri Bolikah v 
KPMG,35 a case which was concerned with a firm of accountants, the House of Lords 
rejected the approach adopted in Rakussen Ellis v Mundey Clarke,36 which required it to 
be demonstrated that there is real mischief and prejudice if the solicitor is allowed to 
act. There the court was content to accept the undertakings and seems to have been in 
favour of allowing the solicitor to act. The remarks of the House of Lords in Bolikah 
were made in the context of the emergence of huge international firms with enormous 
resources operating on a global scale offering a comprehensive range of services. This 
case was dealt with on the basis that the only duty which survives the termination of the 
client relationships is a continuing duty to preserve the confidential information 
imparted during its subsistence.37 The case for a strict approach was found to be 
unanswerable and so it was accepted that the court should intervene unless there is no 
risk of disclosure, although the risk has to be a real one and not fanciful or theoretical, 
but it need not be substantial. Under this approach, the evidential burden shifts once the 
former client has established that the defendant firm is in possession of confidential 
information, which was imparted in confidence and that firm is proposing to act for 
another party with an interest adverse to the former client in a matter to which the 
information is or may be relevant. It is up to the defendant to show that there is no risk 
that information will come into the possession of those acting for the other party. The 
court also has to be satisfied that effective means have been taken, that no reasonable 
disclosure will occur, and the establishment of ad hoc Chinese walls was not considered 
to be an effective measure.38
 
In Canada the Rakussen approach was also rejected in MacDonald Estate v Martin.39 
Under the approach adopted in that case, the court would infer that confidential 
information was imparted once it is shown that there existed a previous relationship 
which is sufficiently related to the retainer from which it is sought to remove the 
solicitor, unless the solicitor satisfies the court that no information was imparted which 
could be relevant. A heavy burden is placed on the lawyer, and assurances and 
undertakings not to use the information are of no avail. Essentially a lawyer who has 
confidential information cannot act against a former client and there is a strong 
inference that lawyers who work together share confidences. The lawyer has to satisfy 
the court that all reasonable means have been taken to ensure that no disclosure will 
occur. In the United Sates, the courts have adopted an even more stringent approach of 
an irrebuttable presumption that the knowledge of one member of a law firm constitutes 
knowledge of all the lawyers in that firm. 
 
                                                 
34  Colonial Portfolio v Nissen [2000] NSWSC 1047; Newman as Trustee for the Estates of Littlejohn 
v Phillips Fox (a firm) [1999] WASC 171. 
35  [1999] 2 WLR 215. 
36  [1912] 1 Ch 831. 
37  Rakussen Ellis v Mundey Clark [1912] 2 Ch 831, 235. 
38  Ibid, 235-7. 
39  (1991) 77 DLR (4th) 249. 
 126
Vol 6 No 1 (QUTLJJ)        A Comparative Evaluation of 
Developments in Equitable Relief 
 
                                                
Aside from lawyers and their clients, the other professional relationship in which breach 
of fiduciary duty claims are being raised, is in the context of the relationship of a 
financial adviser and client. All of the usual fiduciary duties may be brought into play, 
although as yet the body of case law is sparse, but is steadily increasing as a result of the 
growth of financial advisory work undertaken by banks, financial institutions, firms of 
accountants and others operating as independent professional advisers. There have been 
instances of successful claims based on conflict of duty and interest established against 
financial advisers,40 and of additional obligations having to be discharged because of 
the advisory role undertaken which will result in the court examining the quality of the 
advice and the fairness of the transaction.41 There have also been instances in which the 
courts have intervened where there has been a conflict of duty and duty on the part of a 
bank manager.42
 
[204] Developments in relation to non-fiduciary obligations of trustees 
Apart from fiduciary obligations, there are a range of other obligations owed by trustees 
many of which relate to the conduct of trustees in the administration and management 
of trust affairs. The most important of these is the duty of care which the trustee has to 
discharge in the management of trust affairs.  The standard of conduct which the trustee 
is required to adhere to in this context may be less exacting than the fiduciary standard 
and it is sometimes suggested that the duty of care is more akin to that of negligence at 
common law. A few brief observations need to be made about the standard of care 
which will affect the separate responsibilities of each trustee, where there is more than 
one trustee. 
 
It is well established that the duty of a trustee in the conduct of the business of a trust ‘is 
to conduct the business of the trust with the same care as an ordinary man of business 
would extend to his own affairs’.43 This statement of the duty is, however on its own a 
little misleading, for it is also well accepted that a trustee is not in exactly the same 
situation as an ordinary business person.  A trustee is expected to exercise caution so as 
to preserve the trust property and a trustee unlike an ordinary business person does have 
to take into account the interests of the beneficiaries to whom the obligations are owed. 
The expectations and responsibilities of the trustees are therefore significantly different 
to those of an ordinary business person and this may as Finn J pointed out in ASC v AS 
Nominees Ltd,44 be reflected in the ‘different risks that persons who invest their assets 
in companies on the one hand and in trust on the other are considered likely to have 
assumed’.45  
 
As well distinguishing the trustee’s standard of care from that of the ordinary prudent 
business person, there is also scope for a higher standard of care to be expected of some 
trustees in contemporary circumstances. The standard of care was adopted in the late 
nineteenth century at a time when trust corporations were not used for trading and 
investment and at a time when professional trustees were not common. The standard of 
care adopted did not differentiate between different types of trustees. Today, trust 
 
40  Aequitas v AEFC [2001] NSWSC 14. 
41  Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange (1986) 160 CLR 37. 
42  Australian Breeders Co-operative Society Ltd v Jones (1997) 150 ALR 488; The Commonwealth 
Bank v Smith (1991) 102 ALR 453. 
43  Bartlett v Barclays Trust Co (No 1) [1980] 1 ALL ER 139, 150 (Brightman J). 
44  (1995) 62 FCR 504. 
45  ASC v AS Nominees Ltd (1995) 62 FCR 504, 516. 
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corporations and professional trustees are common and as such they invite reliance upon 
themselves by members of the public by virtue of the specialist knowledge which they 
appear to have in the business of trust management. It has therefore been proposed by 
some English and Australian judges, although not yet fully endorsed and regularly 
applied, that a higher duty of care is applicable to someone like ‘a trust corporation 
which carries on a specialised business of trust management’.46 The rationale for the 
higher standard is based on trust corporations holding themselves out in their 
advertising as being above ordinary mortals, who in the conduct of their business 
employ specialist trained trust officers and managers as well as having access to 
financial information and professional advice for dealing with trust problems on a daily 
basis. Under this approach, such trustees would be rendered liable for losses if the loss 
arises from the trustees’ neglect to exercise the special skill and care which it professes 
to have. The scope for liabilities to be established on this basis remains to be fully 
explored. In Queensland the higher duty of care has been introduced as an amendment 
to the Trusts Act 1973.  Section 22(1) of that Act now provides that a trustee in 
exercising a power of investment must ‘(a) if the trustee’s profession, business or 
employment is or includes, acting as a trustee or investing money for other persons - 
exercise the care, diligence and skill a prudent person engaged in that profession, 
business or employment would exercise in managing the affairs of other persons’. The 
section also provides ‘(b) if the trustee’s profession, business or employment is not, or 
does not include, acting as a trustee or investing money for other persons – exercise the 
care diligence and skill a prudent person would exercise in managing the affairs of other 
persons’. 
 
[205] Developments in relation to claims for breach of trust by trustees holding 
funds on a resulting trust 
There have been some recent attempts to render trustees of a resulting trust liable for 
breach of trust. This is an aspect of breach of trust which has so far received little 
attention. On the basis of what little authority that exists, it may be necessary to 
establish some level of knowledge on the part of the resulting trustee in order to succeed 
in such a claim. The matter was considered by McPherson JA in Port of Brisbane 
Corporation v ANZ Securities Ltd,47 without resolving whether there was a resulting 
trust on the facts, with the judge indicating that it would be offensive to notions of 
equity and common sense to hold ANZ Securities liable for a supposed breach of trust 
“it had never undertaken and was not aware that any such obligation existed”.48 In this 
instance, before any claim was made in relation to the money, it had been fully 
disbursed. It also had been received in good faith without any notice that another laid 
claim to the money. ANZ had considered itself a trustee for another, apart from the 
resulting trust alleged by the plaintiff. It had never held the funds as part of its general 
assets. 
 
A similar approach was adopted in the United Kingdom by Robert Walker LJ in Allan v 
Rea Brothers Ltd49 in rejecting a claim, because the trustee company did not at any time 
                                                 
46  Bartlett v Barclays Trust Co (No 1) [1980] 1 ALL ER 139, 152. In ASC Nominees v  AS Nominees 
Ltd (1995) 62 FCR 504, 518 where Finn J accepted that a higher standard of care applied to trustee 
companies although it was not applied in that case. See also Wilkinson v Feldworth Financial 
Services Pty Ltd (1998) 29 ASCR 642, 693 where Rolfe J expressed agreement with Finn J. 
47  [2002] QCA 158. 
48  Port of Brisbane Corporation v ANZ Securities Ltd [2002] QCA 158, [32]. 
49  [2002] EWCA 85. 
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have both actual knowledge that the transfer payment was invalid and should be 
returned, and nor did it have the means of either ascertaining what was due to be 
returned to trustees of a scheme or of raising that sum. The trustee company did not 
know the true position and it was found that the company had made repeated inquiries 
and had been deceived as to the true position. 
 
[206] Developments in relation to recipient liability of third parties for breach of 
trust and breach of fiduciary duty 
There has not been any recent authoritative statement by the High Court as to the 
requirements which have to be satisfied in order to render a third party personally liable 
for a breach of trust. As is the case in some other jurisdictions, there is a diversity of 
approaches which have been adopted, although most of the approaches centre around a 
knowledge based approach. There has been no consistency as to the levels of knowledge 
which have to be satisfied in order establish liability against the third party. Without 
going into the possible five levels of knowledge which have bedevilled this area of 
liability, the more recent authorities have settled on level one to four but not five.50 
This, at least was the approach which found favour with De Jersey J in Doneley v 
Doneley,51 where the judge also acknowledged that a recipient claim is essentially 
proprietary, although it does not require actual possession of trust property or an 
absolute interest in it, in order to establish the recipient element. What it requires is that 
the recipient has been a direct beneficiary of the breach of trust as a result of having 
received the property which is ‘identifiable with the trust property the subject of the 
breach’.52 In this case it was found that the bank knew of all the material facts necessary 
to establish the breach of trust in relation to the securities affecting the trust property. It 
has also been acknowledged in another case that in a recipient claim it is not necessary 
to establish that the defendant acted dishonestly or with a want of probity,53 and in the 
same case the Judge expressed a preference for a strict liability approach, but did not 
apply that approach. This approach will be considered in more detail in a moment, in 
the context of the English developments in relation to recipient liability. 
 
In the United Kingdom there has for many years been an almost endless stream of 
litigation involving claims based on the receipt of trust property in breach of trust by 
third parties, and the courts have found it very difficult to settle on an agreed approach 
for the determination of such claims, other than requiring a requisite level of knowledge 
to render the recipient liable. It also seems to be agreed that dishonesty is not a 
prerequisite for liability. What level of knowledge will suffice has been a matter of 
considerable disagreement, and as will be explained in a moment, the English courts are 
being called upon to abandon the requirement of knowledge altogether. In the period 
following the case of Re Montagu’s Settlement,54 the general trend of authorities was to 
settle on level one to three as the basis for liability to arise, but not levels four and five. 
However, more recently some judges have opted to shift the emphasis away from 
knowledge to commercially unacceptable conduct and to impute knowledge to a person 
guilty of commercially unacceptable conduct. Such an approach does not eliminate 
 
50  Gertsch v Atsas [1999] NSWSC 898, [28] (Foster J); Hancock Memorial Foundation Ltd v 
Porteous [1999] WASC 55, [ 79] (Anderson J); K & S Corporation Ltd v S [2003] SASC 96, [23] 
(Besanko J). 
51  (1998) 1 Qd R 602. 
52  Doneley v Doneely (1998) 1 Qd R 602, 612. 
53  Koorootang Nominees Pty Ltd v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1988] VR 16. 
54  [1975 1 WLR 1240. 
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knowledge entirely as a factor. In BCCI Ltd v Akindele55 it was stated that: ‘All that is 
necessary is that the recipient’s state of knowledge should be such as to make it 
unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt’.56 It was asserted somewhat 
hopefully, that this approach would avoid the difficulties of definition which arise under 
a solely knowledge based approach enabling the ‘courts to give common sense 
decisions in a commercial context”.57 Even so, the findings in that case were still 
expressed in terms of knowledge, and a preference was expressed for liability to be fault 
based. 
 
In contrast to all of the above, stands the approach favoured by Lord Millett as 
enunciated in Twinsectra v Yardley58 to the effect that liability for knowing receipt is 
receipt based and does not depend on fault. The cause of action was identified by Lord 
Millett as restitutionary and is available only where the defendant has received or 
applied money to his own use or benefit. Lord Millett could see no basis for requiring 
actual knowledge of the breach of trust let alone dishonesty, as a condition of liability. 
Constructive notice would be sufficient, although Lord Millett would prefer liability to 
be strict subject to a defence of change of position.59
 
It should also be noted that there is also some scope for recipient liability to arise where 
property is held in a fiduciary capacity, although not trust property in a strict sense. The 
invocation of this category of liability where profits and gains have been received as a 
result of a breach of a fiduciary duty is more problematical because of the absence of 
any pre-existing trust or fiduciary relationship in respect of the property even although 
potentially, the property may be subject to a constructive trust because of the breach of 
fiduciary duty. Such cases would normally fall to be determined under the accessory 
category of liability, the key developments in relation to which will now be explained. 
 
[207] Developments in relation to accessory liability of third parties for breach of 
trust and breach of fiduciary duty 
Once again in Australia there have been no recent pronouncements from the High Court 
in relation to the requirements which have to be satisfied in order to render a third party 
personally liable as an accessory to a breach of trust. One of the key elements that has 
been insisted upon is knowledge, and it would seem that probably levels one to four but 
not five will suffice for the purpose of rendering a third party liable. The courts have 
been unwilling to countenance liability on the basis that the circumstances would have 
put an honest and reasonable person on inquiry. There are signs that the courts in 
Australia will follow the lead provided by their English counterparts and allow 
dishonesty to be accepted as the test of liability in breach of trust claims and that an 
objective test of dishonesty will be adopted.60  
 
It is therefore appropriate and relevant to say something about what has emerged in 
recent English authorities in relation to this issue. There it is accepted that accessory 
liability is not dependent upon the receipt of trust property and that liability does not 
                                                 
55  [2000] 4 ALL ER 221. 
56  BCCI Ltd v Akindele [2000] 4 ALL ER 221, 235. 
57  Ibid, 236. 
58  [2002] UK HL 12 
59  Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] UH HL 12, [ 105] 
60  Beach Petroleum v Kennedy (1997) 26 ACSR 114, 297 (Rolfe J); Voss v Davidson [2002] QSC 
313, [28] where the judge found that the defendant was not acting dishonestly. 
 130
Vol 6 No 1 (QUTLJJ)        A Comparative Evaluation of 
Developments in Equitable Relief 
 
                                                
spring from any proprietary dominion. An accessory claim has been clearly 
differentiated from a receipt claim in so far as an accessory claim is concerned with a 
third party who has interfered with the trust relationship by assisting a trustee so as to 
deprive the beneficiary of the trust property. In Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan61  it was 
emphasised that accessory liability is not property based, and therefore not concerned 
with the liability of a person who has received any property. It focuses on the 
interference with the due performance of the personal fiduciary obligations owed by the 
trustee and as such is fault based. Subsequently, Lord Millett pointed out in Twinsectra 
v Yardley62 that the action is not restitutionary, but one in which the claimant seeks 
compensation for wrongdoing and that liability is not strict.63 It would also seem that 
this category, at least in the United Kingdom, is no longer confined to dishonest and 
fraudulent conduct by the trustee and that it is sufficient if the assistance occurs in 
relation to the use of trust funds not permitted by the trust.64 It is not proposed to 
examine in any detail all of the various requirements which have to be satisfied, but 
instead to focus on developments which have taken place in relation to the requirement 
of knowledge, which was insisted on as one of the key ingredients until the decision in 
Royal Brunei. Once again, it proved difficult for the courts to settle on the levels of 
knowledge required to establish liability, although by about 1995 it seemed to be settled 
that an accessory should know of the relevant facts. In addition, some judges had begun 
to lay particular stress on dishonesty and want of probity as a basis for accessory 
liability. In Royal Brunei it was accepted that dishonesty was a necessary foundation of 
accessory liability, whereas negligence was rejected as the basis of liability, since a 
third party does not normally incur the burden of having to discharge a duty of care 
owed to the beneficiaries. According to Lord Nichols: 
 
A liability in equity to make good the loss attaches to a person who dishonestly 
procures or assist in a breach of trust or breach of fiduciary obligation. It is not 
necessary that, in addition, the trustee or fiduciary was acting dishonestly although this 
will usually be so where the third party is acting dishonestly.65   
 
What does dishonesty or acting with want of probity mean in this context? Under the 
approach adopted by Lord Nichols in Royal Brunei it means: ‘simply not acting as an 
honest person would in the circumstances’.66 Lord Nichols also suggested that it has a 
strong objective element and that it is more concerned with advertent conduct, 
conscious impropriety rather than with inadvertent conduct and that carelessness does 
not constitute dishonesty. It was stressed that the standard of what constitutes objective 
conduct was not left to be determined on the basis of the subjective moral standards of 
the individual and that it would not be enough to escape liability ‘because he believes he 
sees nothing wrong in such behaviour’.67 Honesty was identified as an objective 
standard and that it was a matter of looking at all of the circumstances known to the 
third party at the time, as well as having regard to the personal attributes of the third 
party including ‘experience and intelligence and the reason why he acted as he did.’68 
 
61  [1995] 3 WLR 604.  
62  [2002] UKHL 12. 
63  Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] UH HL 12, [296] 
64  Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 3 WLR 64, 71. 
65  Ibid, 76. 
66  Ibid, 73-4. 
67  Ibid, 64.  
68  Ibid. 
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Lord Nichols, bravely proclaimed that the approach would avoid the “tortious 
convolutions about the sort of knowledge required”69
Notwithstanding the hopes of Lord Nichols for the new approach, what seems to have 
occurred is a new avenue for dispute about the required standard of dishonesty and the 
relevance of subjective factors associated with the specific characteristics of the 
defendant.  Moreover the approach does not seem to have eliminated knowledge 
altogether on the part of the accessory, as a relevant consideration in determining 
liability. In the subsequent case of Twinsectra v Yardley,70  the House of Lords 
interpreted Lord Nichols statements as requiring a subjective test of dishonesty. Lord 
Hoffmann stating that it requires a ‘dishonest state of mind that is consciousness that 
one is transgressing ordinary standards of honest behaviour’71 and Lord Hutton stating 
that an accessory can ‘not be dishonest even if he does not know that what he is doing 
would be dishonest to honest people’.72 Lord Millett delivered a very vigorous dissent 
on the basis that the standard is objective, and that an accessory is required to attain the 
standards which would be observed by a person placed in similar circumstances, 
although account must be taken of subjective considerations such as the defendant’s 
experience, intelligence and his actual state of knowledge, although it is not necessary 
that he actually appreciate what he was doing was dishonest.73 This approach would 
seem to accord with what Lord Nichols said in Royal Brunei, although knowledge 
seems to return through the back door as a factor indicative of dishonesty. 
 
Further clarification has been provided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in Barlow Clowes Internationl Ltd (in liquidation) v Eurotrust International Limited.74 
The judgment was delivered by Lord Hoffman and it should be noted that Lord Nichols 
was present at the hearing. Their Lordships accepted that the standard for determining 
whether the defendant’s mental state can be characterised as dishonest is an objective 
standard and it is irrelevant that the defendant judges honesty by a different standard. It 
was also accepted that a dishonest state of mind is a subjective mental state on the part 
of the person who assists in the breach of trust and that: ‘Such a state of mind may 
consist of knowledge that the transaction is one in which he cannot honestly participate 
(for example, a misappropriation of other people’s money), or it may consist in 
suspicion combined with a conscious decision not to make inquiries’.75
 
It was accepted that there is an element of ambiguity in the remarks of Lord Hutton and 
Lord Hoffman in Twinsectra. According to their Lordships the reference in Lord 
Hutton’s judgment to: 
 
what he knows would offend normally accepted standards of conduct’ meant only that 
his knowledge of the transaction had to be such as to render his participation contrary to 
normally acceptable standards of honest conduct. It did not require that he should have 
had reflections about what those normally acceptable standards were.76  
 
                                                 
69  Ibid, 75. 
70  [2002] 2 WLR 802. 
71  Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] 2 WLR 802, 807. 
72  Ibid, 811. 
73  Ibid, 836. 
74  Judgment delivered on the 10 October 2005. 
75  Barlow Clowes International Ltd ( in liquidation) v Eurotrust International Limited judgment 
delivered on 10 October 2005, [10]. 
76  Ibid, [15]. 
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Similarly the reference by Lord Hoffman to ‘consciousness that one is transgressing 
ordinary standards of honest behaviour’ was interpreted as ‘intended to require 
consciousness of those elements of the transaction which make participation transgress 
the ordinary standards of behaviour. It did not also require him to have thought about 
what those standards were’.77 In addition their Lordships also confirmed that ‘Someone 
can know and certainly suspect, that he is assisting in a misappropriation of money 
without knowing that the money is held on trust or what a trust means’.78 It was also not 
necessary to know the precise involvement of the other party in another’s affairs in 
order to suspect that there was no right to use the money as one’s own. 
 
The approach just outlined is expressed in terms which are applicable to both accessory 
liability for breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty. In Australia it is well 
established that a third party may incur liability as an accessory as a result of 
involvement in the misconduct of a fiduciary, so as to provide an avenue for rendering 
third parties liable to account for profits, benefits and gains received by a third party 
who has participated in the breach of fiduciary duty committed by the fiduciary, as well 
as for losses suffered as a result of the third party’s participation. This was accepted as 
long ago as 1975 by the High Court in Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates 
Ltd.79 The requirements to establish liability in Consul were stated in terms of 
knowledge with levels one to four but not level five being required to establish liability. 
The High Court has not yet had an opportunity to re-examine Consul in the light of 
more recent English developments outlined above, so it is not entirely clear if the 
dishonesty approach will prevail in Australia. In cases decided by both Federal and 
State judges, the approach has been accepted as a statement of modern Australian law.80  
 
In Canada an assistance claim in the context claims for the disgorgement of profits 
received by a third party must, under the current authorities, be based on receipt of a 
benefit with actual knowledge, recklessness or wilful blindness to the breach. The 
Surpreme Court of Canada has not yet pronounced on whether ‘“knowingly” should 
give way to “dishonesty” as the “defining ingredient” of accessory liability’.81
 
III DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO REMEDIES AND DEFENCES FOR BREACH OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTY AND BREACH OF TRUST  
 
[301] Developments in relation to proprietary remedies for breach of fiduciary 
duty 
It is up to the court to determine the appropriate remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty. 
The remedy will depend largely upon the nature of the case. Since the breach of 
obligation is exclusively equitable, the range of remedies are exclusively equitable in 
 
77  Ibid ,[16]. 
78  Ibid, [28]. 
79  (1975)  132 CLR 373. 
80  Aequitas v AEFC [2001] NSWSC 14, [383-384] (Austin J);   Emanuel Management Pty Ltd v 
Foster’s Brewing Group Ltd [2003] QSC 205, [1582], where Chesterman J accepted the 
formulation of Lord Nichols in Royal Brunei indicating that Consul did not ‘contain a definitive 
exposition of the necessary ingredients to establish liability of one who assists in a breach of 
fiduciary duty’. There are also some reported instances in which accessories have been found to 
have acted dishonestly, see Capital Investments Corporation Pty Ltd v Classic Trading Pty Ltd 
[2001] FCA 1385. There are also signs that the dishonesty approach will be adopted in New 
Zealand, see Asian-Pacific Finance Limited v  Wadell [1999] NZCA 92. 
81  Canada Inc v Strother [2005] BCCA 385, [25]. 
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nature.82 The remedial response in equity is in the main different from the common law 
and there is a wider range of remedial considerations which come into play in equity. 
Restoration rather than punishment is the purpose that is sought to be achieved. Relief is 
usually devoid of common law limitations. In addition, presumptions may be available 
to facilitate proof of a claim. Counter-entitlements may be awarded in favour of the 
fiduciary. It is a cardinal principle of equity that the remedy must be fashioned to fit the 
nature of the case and the particular facts. The courts will award whatever remedy may 
be appropriate to achieve an account of the gain derived by the fiduciary. The full range 
of both personal and proprietary remedies is available and many of these remedies go 
beyond offering compensation to the plaintiff. The plaintiff can elect to claim multiple 
or alternate remedies. 
 
In Australia the courts have been called upon to determine the extent to which there is 
scope in a breach of fiduciary duty claim to award proprietary relief, and there have 
been some significant developments in relation to the willingness of the courts to grant 
such relief in such cases. Before discussing these developments it is necessary to place 
this development in the context of other developments which have taken place in 
relation to the requirements which have to be satisfied in order to obtain proprietary 
relief in Australia. These developments have occurred in the context of delineating the 
circumstances in which a proprietary remedy in the form of a constructive trust may be 
awarded as an appropriate form of relief. It should be noted that there may be other 
proprietary remedies such as an equitable lien or charge which may also be part of the 
framework of proprietary remedies available in equity. In a series of cases, the High 
Court of Australia has accepted the constructive trust as an appropriate form of 
equitable relief, beginning in Hospital Products Limited v United Surgical 
Corporation83 where Deane J stated that: ‘a constructive trust may be imposed as the 
appropriate form of relief in circumstances where a person could not in good conscience 
retain a benefit or the proceeds of a benefit in breach of his contractual or other legal or 
equitable obligations’.84 Subsequently in Muschinski v Dodds85 the same judge 
described the constructive trust as a ‘remedial institution which equity imposes 
regardless of actual or presumed intention (and subsequently protects) to preclude the 
retention or assertion of beneficial ownership of property to the extent that such 
retention or assertion would be contrary to equitable principle’.86 Particular emphasis 
was placed on the doctrines of equity which are designed “to prevent a person from 
asserting or exercising a legal right in circumstances where the particular assertion or 
exercise of it would constitute unconscionable conduct”.87 It is generally accepted in 
Australia that in order for a remedial constructive trust to be imposed there has to be 
identifiable trust property to which a trust could attach and a legal or equitable basis for 
treating the retention of the property as unconscionable.  
 
That the constructive trust is available as a remedial response to a claim for equitable 
intervention was confirmed by the High Court in Giumelli v Giumelli88 and as a 
remedial response: ‘It obliges the holder of the legal title to surrender the property in 
                                                 
82  Maguire v Makaronis (1996) 188 CLR 449, 467 (Brennan CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
83  (1984) 156 CLR 41. 
84  Hospital  Products International Pty Ltd v United Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, 125. 
85  (1985) 160 CLR 583. 
86  Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, 614. 
87  Ibid, 619-20. See also Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137. 
88   (1998) 196 CLR 101. 
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question thereby bringing a determination of the rights and titles of the parties’.89 The 
order made by the court is ‘akin to an order for conveyance’.90  In addition ‘it does not 
necessarily impose upon the holder of the legal title the various administrative duties 
and fiduciary obligations which attend the settlement of property to be held by a trustee 
upon an express trust for successive interests’.91 The remedial constructive trust has the 
added dimension of flexibility as to its date of operation. It can be so framed that the 
commencement of its operation may be from the date of judgment or formal order or 
from some other date. This enables the court to protect the legitimate claims of third 
parties particularly creditors who may be prejudiced by the imposition of a constructive 
trust at an earlier date than the judgment or order.92 In other contexts the constructive 
trust is thought to arise as soon as the circumstances necessary for its establishment are 
present.  
 
In New Zealand there has been some support for the acceptance of a remedial 
constructive trust based on unjust enrichment93 rather than unconscionable denial of a 
beneficial interest, whilst in Canada the availability of a constructive trust based on 
unjust enrichment is well established.94 In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords has 
left open the question of whether English law should adopt the remedial constructive 
trust ‘to be decided in some future case when the point is directly in issue’.95
 
The approach of the High Court to the award of a constructive trust in respect of gains 
acquired in breach of fiduciary duty has changed significantly in recent years. In earlier 
authorities, it was asserted that a constructive trust arises in respect of the gains and that 
the advantage must be held for the beneficiary.96 In Henry (Keith) & Co v Walker 
(Stewart)97 Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ indicated that any property acquired 
by use of the fiduciary position is held by the fiduciary in trust for the beneficiaries,98 
whilst in Hospital Products  Mason J also indicated that the fiduciary must account in 
equity, and the appropriate remedy is by means of a constructive trust.99
 
In more recent cases, the Australian courts have adopted a more flexible approach in 
relation to the award of proprietary relief for breach of fiduciary duty. There is no doubt 
that a breach of fiduciary duty may be redressed by relief in the form of a constructive 
trust, and that the claimant may be able to follow and trace the gain into identifiable 
property for the purpose of establishing an entitlement to proprietary relief. This is no 
longer automatic or as of right. In Bathurst City Council v PWC Pty Properties Ltd100 
the court indicated that it was necessary to first decide whether having regard to the 
 
89  Giumelli v Giumelli (1998) 196 CLR 101, 112. 
90  Ibid. 
91  Ibid. 
92  Ibid, 112-13; See also Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, 615. 
93  Hayward v Giordani [1983] NZLR 140, 150 (Cook P);  MacIntosh v Fortex Group Ltd  [1997]  1 
NZLR 711, 721 (Gallen J). 
94  Pettkus v Becker (1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257. 
95  Wesdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington Borough Council [1996] 2 WLR 802, 839. 
96  Wicks v Bennett (1921)  30 CLR 80, 98 (Higgins J). 
97  (1958) 100 CLR 342. 
98  Henry (Keith) & Co v Walker (Stewart) (1958) 100 CLR 342, 350. 
99  Hospital Products International Pty Ltd v United Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41, 108; 
see also Chan v Zacharia (1983) 154 CLR 178, 199 where Deane J indicated that the constructive 
trust which arises because a fiduciary has made an unauthorised gain arises at the time of the 
breach of duty rather than at the time of the court’s order. 
100  [1998] HCA 59. 
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issues in the litigation, there are other remedies available to quell the controversy. An 
equitable remedy which falls short of a trust may assist in avoiding a result in which the 
plaintiff gains a beneficial proprietary interest over equally deserving creditors of the 
defendant.101 In the Queensland decision of the Court of Appeal in Wickham 
Developments Ltd v Parker102 McPherson JA and Pincus JA highlighted the fact that 
liability for breach of fiduciary duty is personal and that it is for the court to decide 
whether a proprietary remedy should be imposed in addition to a personal remedy to 
account. It did not follow that a proprietary remedy would be imposed and that it was 
necessary to consider the impact on general creditors if the fiduciary becomes insolvent. 
This approach severs the issue of liability based on the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship from the issue of what is the appropriate remedy, and whether it is 
appropriate to award the constructive trust as a proprietary remedy.103
 
In more recent cases, the High Court has also expressed a preference for personal 
remedies rather than proprietary remedies in breach of fiduciary cases, as well as in the 
context of other claims such as those based on estoppel. In Warman v Dwyer104  the 
court rejected the constructive trust as the appropriate remedy and indicated that an 
account of profits was the preferred remedy for that case. The liability of the fiduciary 
was considered to be essentially personal.105 In Giumelli v Giumelli106 the court 
considered that an estoppel claim was such that a monetary sum should be fixed to 
represent the value of the equitable claim, with the court indicating that the court should 
first of all decide if there ‘is an appropriate remedy which falls short of the imposition 
of a constructive trust’.107 In addition the High court has also stressed in Warman that 
liability of the fiduciary should not be transformed into a vehicle for the unjust 
enrichment of the plaintiff when assessing the quantum of the profits. The court is 
required to ascertain precisely what the fiduciary should account for as a consequence 
of the fiduciary’s breach of duty or in the case of a loss, the quantum of the loss.108 In 
Warman, the assessment was to be made on the basis of the loss of the agency 
agreement which would only have lasted for a further year. 
 
It is also now well established that equitable compensation may be granted as an 
alternative to a constructive trust. In Distronics Ltd v Edmonds109 it was decided to 
award compensation, and in doing so the judge took into account the fact that it was 
necessary to protect the interests of third parties including those of a mortgagee.110 In 
                                                 
101  Bathurst City Council v PWC Pty Properties Ltd [1998] HCA 59, [42] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ).  
102  [1995] QCA 281. 
103  Wickham Developments Ltd v Parker [1995] QCA 28, [8]. 
104   (1995) 182 CLR 544. 
105  Warman v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544, 555-6 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron JJ). 
106  (1998) 196 CLR 101. 
107  Giumelli v Giumelli (1998) 196 CLR 101, 113 (Glesson CJ, McHugh Gummow and Callinan JJ). 
108  (1995) 182 CLR 544, 561 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ). 
109  [2002] VSC 454. 
110  Distronics Ltd v Edmonds [2002] VSC 454, [213]; See also Victoria University of Technology v 
Wilson (2004) 60 IPR 393, [221-3], where Nettle J decided that it was inequitable to declare a 
constructive trust because of the effect of subsequent developments, particularly the adverse effects 
on third parties. Relief was framed in terms requiring the defendants to pay the claimant the value 
of the shares subject to appropriate expenses and allowances. In addition, the claimant was also to 
be given credit for its time and resources used in the development of software. The judge also 
recommended that a generous view be taken of the contributions made by the defendants in the 
development of software. 
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other cases, judges have been prepared to take account of unjust consequences to the 
fiduciary and the creditor’s of the fiduciary.111  
 
It would seem that as a consequence of these developments in relation to relief for 
breach of fiduciary duty, it is misleading to continue to express the liability of the 
fiduciary in terms of constructive trusteeship as though it will automatically entitle a 
claimant to a proprietary remedy. It also leads one to assume that a constructive trust 
automatically arises prior to the declaration of such a trust. This is no longer the case, as 
liability and remedial issues have been severed so that there are no longer any automatic 
proprietary consequences based on a breach of fiduciary duty. The determination of 
what is the most appropriate form of relief is matter within the discretion of the court. 
The constructive trust has emerged as one of the possible remedies within the armoury 
of the court and when it is invoked the court is free to determine how it will operate in 
any give case having regard particularly to the consequences to third parties arising as a 
result of such relief. It may be that in the vast majority of cases that a constructive trust 
will not be the most appropriate remedy. In both New Zealand112 and Canada a flexible 
approach has been adopted in relation to relief for breach of fiduciary duty and in other 
contexts including breach of confidence claims.113 In these jurisdictions, the 
constructive trust is not considered to be the most appropriate remedy in the vast 
majority of cases. In the United Kingdom there is very little recent authority in relation 
to this matter, and as yet little scope for use of a remedial constructive trust. English 
judges have usually expressed the liability of the fiduciary as being a personal one,114 
and instances of proprietary relief being utilised for the recovery of gains from a breach 
of fiduciary duty are hard to find except in relation to the renewal of leases and the 
purchase of freehold reversions. Proprietary relief has also been usually restricted to 
claims which are based on an established equitable interest in property, as for example, 
where trust or company property is misappropriated or utilised for the purpose of 
making a gain in breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
There is a further consequence of the above developments, which is in need of re-
consideration in the light of these developments and that is the assumption in Attorney 
General for Hong Kong v Reid115 that as soon as a bribe is received by a fiduciary it is 
held on a constructive trust for the person injured.116 This means that the injured party is 
entitled to seek a proprietary remedy as of right, rather than depending upon the 
exercise of the court’s discretion.  As such, the constructive trust under this approach is 
institutional rather than remedial. Such an approach is incompatible with the approach 
which now prevails in the context of other situations in which relief is sought for breach 
of fiduciary duty in which the award of proprietary relief is at the discretion of the court. 
There is no compelling reason why the approach adopted in relation to relief available 
in respect of bribes received by a fiduciary or a third party should fall outside of this 
general framework, although there is and ought to remain scope for proprietary relief in 
 
111  Katingal Pty Ltd v Amor (1998) 162 ALR 287, 290 (Burchett J). 
112  Estates Realties  v Wignall [1991] 3 NZLR 482 (Tipping J); Official Assignee of Collier v 
Creighton[1996] UKPC 7. 
113  LAC Minerals v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 61 DLR (4th)14, 64 (La Forest J). 
114  Regal Hastings v Gulliver [1942] 1 ALL ER 378 where relief was restricted to a personal liability 
to account. 
115  [1993] 3 WLR 1143. 
116  Attorney General for HGong Kong v Reid [1993] 3 WLR 1143, 1146 (Lord Templeman). 
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the case of a bribe. Equally there ought also to be scope to take into account the adverse 
consequences to third parties of awarding such relief  
 
[302] Developments in relation to equitable compensation as a remedy for breach 
of trust and breach of fiduciary duty 
One of the key remedies which is utilised for the purpose of providing relief in respect 
of both breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty claims is that of an award of 
equitable compensation. In both contexts, the courts have had to address a number of 
issues in relation to the assessment of the quantum of the compensation. Here attention 
will be focused on issues of causation, contributory responsibility and the 
apportionment of losses as well as exemplary damages. 
 
In breach of trust claims, the courts have had to decide whether a trustee who is liable to 
compensate the beneficiary for losses should be confined to making good losses that are 
caused by the breach of trust. This issue has been addressed in the context of the almost 
universal acceptance of the proposition derived from an extensive statement by Street 
CJ in Re Dawson117 that the obligation of a defaulting trustee is essentially that of 
effecting restitution to the trust estate.  In Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison118 the High 
Court of Australia accepted that the quantum of the compensation is to be determined at 
the trial using the full benefit of hindsight,  and in that instance was satisfied that the 
loss would not have been suffered but for the breach.119 In adopting this approach, the 
court approved of some statements by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the decision of the 
House of Lords in Target Holdings v Redferns.120
 
In Target, one of the issues addressed was whether a trustee was liable to compensate 
the beneficiary for not only losses caused by the breach of trust but also for losses 
which the beneficiary would have suffered in any event if there had not been a breach of 
trust. It was accepted that compensation should be confined to making good losses 
caused by the breach of trust and that the quantum should be fixed at the date of 
judgment.121 It was also accepted, that in this instance, the transaction would have gone 
ahead even if there had been no breach of trust. This does not mean that the common 
law rules as to the assessment of damages apply in the context of a traditional trust, 
although there does have to be some causal connection between the breach of trust and 
the loss to the trust estate, for which compensation is recoverable. It should be noted 
that the remarks of Lord Browne-Wilkinson were made in the context of a bare trust and 
in which the transaction was completed. In this instance it was considered to be artificial 
to talk in terms of the obligation to re-constitute the trust so as to enable the beneficiary, 
in this case the client of a solicitor, to recover from the solicitor more than the client had 
in fact lost. Relief was restricted to requiring the solicitor to restore moneys wrongly 
paid away from the solicitor’s trust account before completion of the transaction.  In the 
end, the court was unwilling to give compensation for losses not caused by the breach 
and the loss was measured at the time of the judgment with the full benefit of hindsight. 
It is also worthwhile to consider the approach which has been adopted in relation to the 
issue of causation when assessing compensation for breach of fiduciary duty given that 
                                                 
117  [1966] 2 NSWLR 211, 214-16. 
118  (2003) 212 CLR 484. 
119  Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison (2003) 212 CLR 484 , 504 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, 
Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
120  [1995] 3 WLR 352. 
121  Target Holdings v Redferns [1995] 3 WLR 352, 363. 
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it is now widely accepted that equitable compensation can now be ‘awarded for a wide 
variety of infractions of fiduciary and other duties’122 across a number of common law 
jurisdictions.123 In Australia, the High court is yet to formally confirm what principles 
will be adopted in claims for compensation for breach of fiduciary duty although there 
are some indications provided in Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq)124 even although it 
was accepted that no relevant fiduciary duty was owed in this instance. The court 
therefore did not consider it necessary to provide an ‘exhaustive consideration of the 
topic’.125 What does emerge from statements in this case is that the measure of 
compensation for breach of fiduciary duty is to be determined by equitable principles, 
and that these do not necessarily reflect the rules for the assessment of damages at 
common law in tort or contract.126 Although, Kirby J dissented in this case and found 
that a fiduciary obligation had arisen, Kirby J also accepted that the measure of 
equitable compensation would differ from the measure of common law damages and 
that often the measure would be greater in equity.127
 
The matter was also touched upon again by the High Court in Maguire v Makaronis128 
where Brennan CJ, McHugh, and Gummow JJ did accept that there was ‘need to 
specify criteria for a sufficient connection or causation between the breach of duty and 
the profit derived or the loss sustained or the asset’.129 Particular importance was 
attached to the obligation of a defaulting trustee to effect restitution to the trust estate, 
and a presumption that the default continues until restitution has been made. Particular 
importance was also attached to holding trustees to their duties and the need to protect 
the interests of the beneficiaries. In addition, a similar stringent response was 
considered to be appropriate in relation to other delinquent fiduciaries, particularly 
solicitors and other professional advisers.  In this context, the same judges, as well as 
Kirby J, accepted the continuing applicability of the reasoning in an early decision by 
the Privy Council in London Loan Savings Co v Brickenden,130 that it is not open to the 
court to speculate what course would have been adopted if the fiduciary in breach of 
duty had have discharged the obligation to make disclosure of material facts.131  This 
would seem to preclude the court from speculating about what the beneficiary would 
have done in the event that the fiduciary has fulfilled his or her obligations. 
 
Notwithstanding the High Court’s re-assertion of the importance attached to the 
obligation of the defaulting fiduciary to make restitution, there have been a series of 
judgments by both State and Federal judges in which the issue of causation has been 
addressed in breach of fiduciary duty claims, on the basis that the assessment of 
compensation can be made having regard to the full benefit of hindsight and that it is 
necessary to establish that the breach of fiduciary duty caused the loss. Under this 
approach there has to be an adequate or sufficient connection between the breach and 
 
122  Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 10, [124] (Mason P). 
123  Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 832, 951 (Viscount Haldane); McKenzie v McDonald [1927] 
VLR 134, 146 (Dixon AJ). 
124   (2001) 207 CLR 165. 
125  Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165, 195-6. 
126  Ibid, 224-5. 
127  Ibid, 201. 
128  (1996) 188 CLR 449. 
129  Maguire v Makaronis (1996) 188 CLR 449, 468 (Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, and Gummow 
JJ). 
130  [1934] DLR 465. 
131  (1996) 188 CLR 449, 474 (Brennan CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow JJ), 492 (Kirby J). 
139 
COPE (2007) 
 
the loss.132 Similar developments have occurred in Canada, as exemplified in Canson 
Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co133 where a solicitor was held responsible only for the 
losses directly flowing from the breach of duty, but not for losses caused by an 
intervening act unrelated to the breach of duty. There, one judge was prepared to follow 
the common law in assessing damages,134 whilst another was prepared to assess the loss 
at the time of the trial using the full benefit of hindsight and insisted that there needed to 
be a link between the equitable breach and the loss for which compensation is claimed. 
However, in other cases the courts have not been so keen to follow the approach in 
Canson in the context of different types of breach of fiduciary duty and have insisted on 
the full restitutionary approach.135 In the United Kingdom, the matter is yet to be 
considered by the House of Lords. There are instances in which Brickenden has been 
accepted and applied,136 and in other instances it has been accepted that it is necessary 
to address the issue of causation, so that it is necessary to show that the loss suffered has 
been caused by the relevant breach of fiduciary duty.137 In the case of Swindle v 
Harrison,138 a majority of the Court of Appeal were satisfied that the loss did not flow 
from the failure to make full disclosure because the disclosure would not have affected 
the claimant’s decision to proceed with the transaction. 
 
In the context of awarding equitable compensation as relief for breach of trust or breach 
of fiduciary duty, the courts have also been called upon to determine whether there is 
any scope for the apportionment of losses. In breach of trust claims, it has generally 
been assumed that the courts are not able to apportion losses on the basis of some form 
of equitable distribution or on the basis of a consideration of contributory negligence on 
the part of the claimant. Judgment for the full amount of the loss will be awarded so as 
to replenish the trust. In Australia, the High Court has re-affirmed the opinion expressed 
in Astley v Australia Ltd139that there are: ‘severe conceptual difficulties in the path of 
acceptance of notions of contributory negligence to diminish awards of equitable 
compensation for breach of fiduciary duty’.140 This was rationalised on the basis that 
contributory responsibility focuses on the conduct of the claimant, whereas fiduciary 
law focuses on the obligations of the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries. In contrast, there has been some judicial acceptance in New Zealand of 
contributory responsibility as a complete or partial defence to a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty based in part on the fusion of law and equity, and by analogy with the 
                                                 
132  Greater Pacific Investments Pty Ltd v Australian National Industries Ltd (1969) 39 NSWLR 143; 
Beach Petroleum v Kennedy (1997) 26 ACSR 114;  Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (1994) 
13 WAR 11; Coomera Resort Pty Ltd v Kolback [1998] QSC 20; Karam v ANZ Banking Group Ltd 
[2001] NSWSC 709; O’Halloram v RT Thomas & Family Pty Ltd 39 ACSR 148; Aequitas v AEFC 
[2001] NSWSC 14. 
133  (1991) 85 DLR (4th) 129. 
134  Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co (1991) 85 DLR (4th) 129, 147 (La Forest J). 
135  Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226, 294-5 (McLachlin J); Hodgkinson v Simms (1994) 117 DLR 
(4th) 161, 201-3 and 207-9 (La Forest J). 
136  Bristol & West Building Society  v May  May & Merrimans  ( a firm) [1996] 2 All ER 801, 826  
(Chadwick J). 
137  Swindle v Harrison [1997] 4 ALL ER 705, 733 (Mummery LJ); see also Satnam Investments Ltd v 
Dunlop Heywood &Co Ltd [1999] 3 ALL ER 652. 
138  [1974] 4 ALL ER 705. 
139  (1997) 197 CLR 1. 
140  Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2001) 207 CLR 165, 201-2 (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and 
Callinan JJ). 
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Contributory Negligence Act.141 Such an approach has not been universally 
supported,142 and even if such a defence can be raised it is still necessary to make out a 
very strong case given the very high standards expected of fiduciaries. 
 
In some jurisdictions, the courts have also had to consider whether in exercise of the 
equitable jurisdiction over fiduciaries, it is possible for an award of exemplary damages 
to be made to punish the fiduciary for reprehensible conduct, as well as to deter others 
of like mind from similar conduct. Different responses have arisen in different 
jurisdictions. In Australia, the courts have responded in the negative, although in one 
instance there has been an outstanding dissent from this view. In Queensland, Moynihan 
J in Taylor & Co v Peffer143 accepted the defendant’s submission: ‘that it is difficult to 
reconcile a notion of exemplary damages and an account’.144 In New South Wales, the 
matter was comprehensively examined by the Court of Appeal in Digital Pulse Pty Ltd 
v Harris,145 following a decision by the trial judge that Australian law permits such an 
award. By a majority, the Court of Appeal decided that there is no power to award 
exemplary damages for breach of fiduciary duty, although Mason P in a well considered 
dissent, declined to regard the proposition that equitable compensation was indicative of 
the limits of monetary relief available in equity suggesting that the remedies go far 
beyond offering compensation. 
 
In Canada, there have been some isolated judicial statements that exemplary damages 
are available for breach of fiduciary duty.146 In New Zealand, it has been accepted that 
exemplary damages are available for breach of fiduciary duty in: ‘serious and 
exceptional cases,’147and it was also accepted by Cook P in Acquaculture Corporation v 
NZ Green Mussell Co148 that exemplary damages could be awarded for actionable 
breach of confidence, although in this case Somers J regarded equity and penalties as 
strangers. 
 
[303] Developments in relation to equitable compensation as a remedy for breach 
of an equitable duty of care by a fiduciary 
In Mothew v Bristol West Building Society149 Millett LJ suggested that: ‘Although the 
remedy which equity makes available for breach of the equitable duty of skill and care 
is equitable compensation rather than damages this is merely the product of history and 
in this context is a distinction without a difference’.150 On that basis Millett LJ  
therefore concluded that:  
 
There is no reason in principle why the common law rules should not be applied by 
analogy to such a case. It should not be confused with equitable compensation for 
 
141  Day v Mead [1987] 2 NZLR 443 at 451-452 Cook P; Mouat v Clark Boyce [1991] 1 NZLR 481, 
498-9 (Cook P). 
142  See the judgment of Somers J in Day v Mead [1987] 2 NZLR 443, 461-2; See also Lankshear v 
ANZ [1993] 1 NZLR 481, where Wallace J decided that the actions of the plaintiff did not justify 
apportionment in a claim against a third party. 
143  [1996] QSC 248. 
144  Taylor & Co v Peffer [1996] QSC 248. 
145  [2002] NSWSC 14. 
146  Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226, 298. 
147  Cook v Evatt (No 2) [1992] 1 NZLR 676, 706 (Fisher J). 
148  [1990] 2 NZLR 29. 
149  [1997] 2 WLR 436. 
150  Mothew v Bristol West Building Society [1997] 2 WLR 436, 449. 
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breach of fiduciary duty which may be awarded in lieu of rescission or specific 
restitution. This leaves those duties which are special to fiduciaries and which attract 
those remedies which are peculiar to the equitable jurisdiction and are primarily 
restitutionary or restorative rather than compensatory”.151  
 
This approach has been followed by New Zealand judges152  and by some Australian 
judges. In Permanent Building Society v Wheeler153 Malcolm CJ, Seaman and Ipp JJ in 
a joint judgment of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia said: 
 
there is a fundamental distinction between breaches of fiduciary obligations which 
involve dishonesty and abuse of the trustee’s advantages and the vulnerable position of 
the beneficiaries on the one hand and honest but careless dealings which breach mere 
equitable obligations on the other. There is ample justification on policy grounds for 
more stringent rules in the case of breaches of fiduciary obligations but not where there 
has been honest but careless dealings.  A court of equity applying principles of fairness 
should not require an honest but careless trustee to compensate a beneficiary for losses 
without proof that but for the breach of duty those losses would not have occurred. It is 
significant as regards matter of policy, that tortious duty not to be negligent and the 
equitable obligation on the part of trustees to exercise reasonable care and skill are in 
content the same. There is every reason in such circumstances to apply the equitable 
maxim that equity follows the law.154
 
Notwithstanding the above approach, it should not necessarily be assumed that the High 
Court of Australia will open the door for the assimilation of the calculation of 
compensation in equity with the calculation of compensatory damages in tort or 
contract. Such an approach did not find favour with Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, 
Kirby and Hayne JJ in Youyang155 although in that instance: ‘the complaint was not 
merely of the imprudent exercise of a power of an investment, by failure to employ care 
and diligence which equity requires’.156  It was acknowledged that it had been accepted 
in some cases where the maladministration involves a failure to exercise care and 
diligence that equity requires, that an award of equitable compensation resembles 
common law damages. Even although this question did not arise in the appeal, Glesson 
CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ went on to suggest that:  
 
there must be a real question whether the unique foundations and goals of equity which 
has the institution of the trust at its heart, warrant any assimilation even in this limited 
way of the measure of measure of compensatory damages in tort and contract. It may be 
thought strange to decide that the precept that trustees are to be kept by courts of equity 
up to their duty has an application limited to the observance by trustees of some only of 
their duties to beneficiaries in dealing with trust funds.157  
 
                                                 
151  Ibid.   See also Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood [2005] 1 WLR 567, where Lord Walker relied 
on these remarks in the context of suggesting that  the quantum of equitable compensation payable 
for a breach of fiduciary obligation would be the same as the quantum for the breach of the 
contract of retainer. 
152  BNZ v NZ Guardian Trust Co Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 664, 682 (Gault J); 686-8 (Tipping J). 
153  (1994) 14 ACSR 109. 
154  Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (1994) 14 ACSR 109, 166. The same sort of reasoning was 
also adopted in Australian Breeders Co-operative Ltd v Griffith Morgan Jones [1997] FCA 1405. 
155  Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison (2003) 212 CLR 484. 
156  Ibid, 500. 
157  Ibid.  
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This statement seems to be directed particularly at trustees in relation to their dealings 
with trust funds but one might reasonably anticipate that a similar approach might be 
adopted in relation to a claim based on a lack of care and diligence by a fiduciary other 
than a trustee. It seems unlikely the High Court would favour the intermingling of law 
and equity for the purpose of assessing equitable compensation for breach of an 
equitable duty of care on the part of trustees and other fiduciaries. This stands in marked 
contrast to the approach which has found favour in the United Kingdom, New Zealand 
and Canada. 
 
[304] Developments in relation to following and tracing property in equity 
In the next section, comments are provided about some of the developments which have 
occurred in relation to the operation of the rules for following and tracing  trust property 
in equity in breach of trust claims for the purpose of maintaining a proprietary claim to 
the trust property resulting in the award of a proprietary remedy usually in the form of a 
constructive trust or equitable charge or lien.  Before considering proprietary relief in 
the context of claims for breach of trust, it is necessary to provide some background 
information about developments which have occurred in relation to the general 
requirements, which have to be satisfied in order to follow and trace property in equity. 
Proprietary relief in the context of breach of fiduciary claims has already been 
considered in an earlier section, although the developments there, referred to in relation 
to the basis upon which proprietary relief is available in Australia, are also relevant to 
the background which is presented here about developments in relation to the 
requirements which have to be satisfied in order to follow and trace property in equity. 
 
It is now widely acknowledged that following and tracing is a process which can be 
invoked for the purpose of ascertaining what has happened to the claimant’s property.  
Following is the process of following the same asset at moves from hand to hand and 
tracing is the process of identifying a new asset as the substitute for the old asset. The 
boundaries or the limits of this process are set by the doctrine of the bona fide 
purchaser. In the decision of the House of Lords in Foskett v McKeown,158 Lord Millett 
described tracing as a process whereby assets are identified and as belonging in the 
realm of evidence, and as such tells us nothing about the legal or equitable right to the 
asset traced. It is not a claim or remedy but: ‘Merely the process whereby a claimant 
demonstrates what has happened to his property, identifies its proceeds and the persons 
who have handled or received them, justifies his claim that the proceeds can properly be 
regarded as representing his property’.159 Tracing involves the identification of: ‘the 
traceable proceeds of the claimant’s property160 and ‘enables the claimant to substitute 
the traceable proceeds of the original asset as the subject matter of his claim’.161 
However, it does not effect or establish the claim, which under orthodox principles, to 
be considered in a moment, depend upon the nature of the claimant’s interest in the 
original asset. The claimant will normally be able to maintain the same claim to the 
substituted asset as he could have maintained to the original asset subject to: ‘potential 
defences as a result of intervening transactions’162  including the defence of bona fide 
purchaser and the defence of change of position. Under this analysis, which has found 
 
158  [2000] 2 WLR 1299. 
159  Foskett v McKeown [2000] 2 WLR 1299, 1323. 
160  Ibid.  
161  Ibid.  
162  Ibid.  
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acceptance in some judicial statements in Australia,163 the process of identification is 
not be confused with a proprietary right, although the conduct of the process may also 
be a required as a preliminary step when making a proprietary as well as a personal 
claim against a recipient or accessory, because in respect of some of these claims it is 
still necessary to demonstrate what has happened to the claimant’s property. Moreover, 
a claimant does not have to seek a proprietary remedy, and may elect instead to seek a 
personal remedy, in which case it does not mean that the claimant has ratified the 
actions of the defendant.164
 
Under well established principles, the right to follow and trace the property into the 
hands of third parties and into other substituted property is said to depend upon the 
existence of an existing equitable proprietary interest. Proprietary claims in equity are 
said to depend upon the establishment of an existing equitable proprietary right.  Under 
this approach, the proprietary claim is based on the vindication of ‘a proprietary right 
and is not based on unjust enrichment or unjust factor. It is not dependent upon the 
discretion of the judge.165 It is necessary to identify that interest and to establish the 
priority of that interest against other claimants, as well as establishing that the property 
in question represents the whole or part of that interest. The claimant will succeed by 
virtue of title to the property and not on the basis of what is determined to be fair just 
and reasonable.166
 
In accordance with the need to base a proprietary claim on the existence of an equitable 
interest in the property, a fiduciary relationship in respect of the property which is the 
subject matter of a proprietary claim, has been regarded as a pre-condition which must 
be satisfied in order to follow and trace property as the identifiable subject matter of the 
proprietary relief. In Re Diplock,167 the Court of appeal insisted that a fiduciary 
relationship was an essential pre-requisite, although it was sufficient that there was a 
fiduciary relationship between the claimant and a third party, through whose hands the 
property passed. It did not have to exist between the claimant and the defendant, thus 
enabling the next of kin in that case to claim against the defendant charities, who did not 
stand in a fiduciary relationship to the claimant in circumstances where the executors 
had paid away money under a mistake to the charities. The English judges have 
continued to insist ever since Diplock that there must be some fiduciary relationship 
which permits the assistance of equity to be raised. There must be some initial fiduciary 
relationship to start the tracing process in equity.168
 
The matter was once again considered by Lord Millett in the decision of the House of 
Lords in Foskett v McKeown.169 Although reservations were expressed about the 
requirement, it was not abandoned. Moreover, it was not necessary to explore the matter 
in any detail as it was a straightforward case in which a trustee had misappropriated 
trust money and mixed it with the trustee’s own money in order to pay for an asset for 
the benefit of the trustee’s children.170 As one judge has pointed out in a subsequent 
                                                 
163  Evans Associates  v European Bank Limited [2004] NSWCA 82, [134] (Spiegleman CJ). 
164  Foskett v McKeown [2002] 2 WLR 1299 at 1323-1325.  
165  Ibid, 1322 - 3. 
166  Ibid.  
167  [1948] 1 Ch 465. 
168  Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1989] 3 WLR 1367, 1386 (Millett J); Boscawen v Baja [1996] 1 WLR 
329, 335 (Millett LJ). 
169  [2000] 2 WLR 1299. 
170  Foskett v McKeown [2000] 2 WLR 1299, 1324. 
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case, Lord Millett: ‘stopped short of deciding that the traditional pre-condition of 
tracing in equity should be overruled’.171 Hence, it is still necessary in the United 
Kingdom to raise an equity to follow and trace property on the basis of a fiduciary 
relationship. 
 
It is necessary to briefly reflect on whether there is any such requirement under 
Australian law. It is not entirely certain that such a requirement will be insisted upon in 
Australia, although the existence of such a requirement has been acknowledged in New 
Zealand.172 This matter must also be considered in the context of the acceptance in 
Australia of the remedial constructive trust, which enables a proprietary claim to be 
sustained even although there is not any subsisting equitable interest as the basis for 
sustaining a proprietary claim to identifiable property. There is no decision binding on 
lower courts in Australia which requires a fiduciary relationship for the purpose of 
maintaining a proprietary claim and for the purpose of enabling the claimant to follow 
and trace property in equity. It may therefore be the case that it is not a requirement 
which has to be satisfied under Australian law, given that a remedial constructive trust 
is available on the basis of an unconscionable denial of a beneficial interest, and that 
proprietary relief does not have to be confined within a framework of established 
categories, largely dependent upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship. This avoids 
the temptation to distort the notion of a fiduciary relationship, as sometimes occurs, in 
order to invoke the armoury of proprietary remedies, and it enables flexibility  and 
discretionary considerations to play their part when the proprietary claim is sought 
without any established proprietary right as the foundation of the claim. It also takes 
into account the existence of a variety of rationales for equitable relief, apart from 
instances which involve a breach of trust or a breach of fiduciary duty.  
 
[305] Developments in relation to the rules for following and tracing trust 
property in equity 
It is now necessary to turn our attention to some developments in relation to aspects of 
the rules which evolved in equity for the purpose of following and tracing property in 
equity, when the pre-condition of a fiduciary relationship is satisfied. It is necessary to 
observe that both the common law and equity developed rules and presumptions in 
relation to following value through a series of transactions.  Not only were the rules in 
equity differentiated from the common law rules on the basis of the requirement of a 
fiduciary relationship, but the rules themselves were better able than the common law 
rules, to deal with intermingling of funds in bank accounts and in other substitutions. 
Equity, unlike the common law, was able to resolve an amalgam into its separate parts 
by notionally charging a fund for the purpose of recovering the intermingled amount. 
Notwithstanding these differences, the process is the same at common law and equity, 
although there are different pre-conditions which have to be satisfied in order to invoke 
the process. Lord Milett drew attention to this in Foskett v McKeown,173  indicating that 
the requirement in equity of a fiduciary relationship relates not to the process but to the 
nature of the claim or right, rather than the exercise of identification.  In his opinion, 
there is nothing inherently legal or equitable about the exercise of identification, and 
hence no logical justification for different rules for tracing at law or in equity and for the 
distinction to produce capricious results in cases of mixed funds. On the other hand, 
whether a proprietary claim could be maintained was a different matter, and it is in that 
 
171  Shalson v Russo [2003] EWCH 1637 (Rimer J). 
172  Re Arariamu Holdings Ltd [1898] 3 NZLR 487, 492 (Wylie J.) 
173  [2000] 2 WLR 1299, 1324. 
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context, at least in the United Kingdom, that the existence of a fiduciary relationship 
may still be relevant, but not in relation to the process of tracing whether it be at law or 
in equity. 
 
It may be that the time has come for the maintenance of separate rules for the location 
of value to be abandoned irrespective of whether the claim is a legal or an equitable 
claim. The process is inherently the same whether one is seeking to enforce a legal or an 
equitable right.  This seems to have been contemplated by Lord Millett in Foskett  in 
indicating that: ‘There was certainly no justification for allowing any distinction 
between them to produce a capricious result in cases of mixed substitutions by insisting 
upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship as a pre-condition for applying equity’s 
tracing rules’.174  However, it would seem that ‘it cannot be said that Foskett has swept 
away the long recognised difference between common law and equitable tracing’,175 in 
so far as he: ‘stopped short of deciding that the traditional pre-conditions of tracing in 
equity should be overruled’176 in English law. 
 
There are some aspects of developments which have occurred in relation to the 
operation of the equitable rules for following and tracing trust property in breach of 
trust claims which are worth mentioning. It seems to be now well established that a 
beneficiary does have the option to claim a proportionate interest when tracing 
misappropriated trust property into mixed substitutions. This seems to be well 
established in Australia on the basis of the decision of the High court in Scott v Scott177 
that the beneficiaries may elect to: ‘take such part as bears the same proportion to the 
whole of the misapplied trust moneys bore to the purchase price178  including the profit 
irrespective of whether the property is specifically severable or not.179 Various 
mechanisms, including a charge and a constructive trust, are available to give effect to 
each party’s proportionate entitlements.180
 
In the United Kingdom, it is also now accepted as: ‘established law that the mixed fund 
belongs proportionately to those whose money was mixed’.181 According to Lord 
Millett in Foskett, the beneficiary has the option to take a proportionate part of the 
property or a lien on it, depending on which is the most advantageous when a trustee 
had bought property partly with his or her own moneys and partly with misapplied trust 
moneys. The lien will be available for the amount of the misappropriated trust moneys. 
It does not matter whether the mixing precedes the investment or occurs at the time of 
the investment by making simultaneous or sequential payments out of different funds. It 
is only necessary to show that the claimant’s property contributed to the acquisition of 
the new asset. It is not necessary to establish that it has contributed to any increase in 
the value of the new asset.182
 
                                                 
174  Foskett v McKeown [2000] 2 WLR 1299, 1324.   
175  Shalson v Russo [2003] EWCH 1637 (Rimer J). 
176  Ibid.  
177  (1962) 109 CLR 649. 
178  Scott v Scott (1962) 109 CLR 649, 661. 
179  Ibid, 663; see also Hagan v Waterhouse (1993) 34 NSWLR 308, 255. 
180  Australian Postal Corporation v Lutak (1991) 21 NSWLR 384. In this case an apportionment of 
the profits was not considered to be just. 
181  Foskett v McKeown [2000[ 2 WLR 1299, 1305 *Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
182  Ibid, 1326-7. 
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In circumstances where the asset has been disposed of in favour of a gratuitous donee, 
the donee is unable to acquire any better title than the trustee wrongdoer, and the lien is 
enforceable against the trustee and those who claim under him other than a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice. The beneficiary is able to enforce the lien against 
any part of the property, and those who take through the wrongdoer must subordinate 
their claim until the beneficiary’s contribution is satisfied. In this context, innocent 
recipients will be in no better position than the wrongdoer trustee donor of the innocent 
recipients.  
 
Apart from a lien for the amount of the misappropriated trust moneys, it was also 
accepted in Foskett that the beneficiaries may also seek to claim any increase in value 
based on their contribution, as against those who claim as substitutes through the 
wrongdoer, on the basis of a pro-rata division of the property. There is also scope for 
such a division to be excluded, and sometimes the beneficiary may be able to claim all 
of the property against the wrongdoer and those other than a bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice, including volunteers.183  In Foskett, the children of the trustee who 
were volunteers of the asset acquired with funds, consisting of the trustee’s own funds 
and misappropriated trust funds, were considered to be in no better position than the 
wrongdoer from whom they acquired the asset gratuitously. They were not able to raise 
the defence of a bona fide purchaser.  
 
In Diplock, it was decided that where an innocent volunteer has mixed his or her own 
funds with those of the beneficiary’s funds, both parties are required to recognise each 
other’s claims to the fund and the claim of the equitable owner is not entitled to take 
priority against the claim of the volunteer.184 The result is that each share pari passu. 
This approach was endorsed in Foskett, by Lord Millett as applicable where a mixed 
fund consists of misapplied trust property and contributions of innocent parties rather 
than the trustee’s own contribution to the mixed fund. In such instances the claims 
would be treated inter se, as there is no basis upon which such claims are able to be 
subordinated to any others. The beneficiaries and the innocent contributors are required 
to share the property rateably and the gains and losses will also be borne rateably.  
 
The rules for following and tracing property in equity have also evolved for the purpose 
of dealing with the allocation of losses between two or more claimants to a mixed fund, 
including mixed funds which consist of more than one set of beneficiaries. One of the 
problems which arises, is how are losses to be borne between claimants when moneys 
are withdrawn from the fund and dissipated. Sometimes the rule in Clayton’s case is 
applied, that is losses are allocated on a first in first out basis. On other occasions, the 
losses are attributed pari passu as between the beneficiaries constituting the fund. It is 
now generally accepted in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom 
that the first in first out principle is not necessarily appropriate for application to large 
funds between the victims of large scale fraud.185 Sometimes the courts will regard the 
moneys as consisting of a common pool enabling the contributors share rateably on the 
basis that the equities are equal.186 There are no hard and fast rules and the courts will 
endeavour to adopt the most equitable formulae having regard to a range of factors. 
There are a number of reported instances in which Australian judges have demonstrated 
 
183  Ibid, 1326-7. 
184  Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465, 539 (Lord Greene). 
185  El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc (No 2) [1995] 2 ALL ER 213, 222 (Robert Walker J). 
186  This approach was adopted in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan [1992] 4 ALL ER 22. 
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a marked reluctance to apply the rule in Clayton’ case, in the context of mixed funds 
from more than one trust particularly where the claimants have participated in a 
common pooled fund.187 Funds are very often distributed proportionately on the basis of 
contributions to the funds particularly if no other rational basis is available to 
distinguish the contributions of different claimants. Sometimes the court is able to use 
records to differentiate between different claimants.  In New Zealand, it has also been 
accepted that the rule in Clayton’s case can be displaced if it is impossible to determine 
the order of payments in or out,188 and in Canada pro rata sharing has been considered 
to be a more workable rule.189 In addition, the courts in Canada have also declined to 
apply the lowest intermediate balance rule which leads to a conclusion that a 
particularly beneficiary’s share has been misappropriated and dissipated. Pro rata 
sharing of funds which remain has been permitted amongst multiple contributors to a 
common pool.190 It also should be noted that Clayton’s case has been accepted as 
applicable in the case of mixed funds of an innocent volunteer and trust funds but only 
in instances of an active unbroken bank account. A rateable division is regarded as 
applicable to other property acquired by a volunteer utilising such a mixed fund,191 
although it has been asserted in more recent English cases that the claimant should be 
able to recover in full, the traceable proceeds out of mixed fund, without having to 
acknowledge the entitlement of the innocent volunteer to a share of the funds, subject to 
a defence of change of position.192
 
It has already been demonstrated that a degree of flexibility has been adopted for the 
purpose of identifying the claimant’s property when the process of following and 
tracing trust property is invoked. In the United States it is also possible under what is 
referred to as the ‘swollen asset’ theory to obtain proprietary relief even although the 
claimant is unable to identify specific property by application of the traditional rules and 
presumptions for following and tracing property. So far, that approach has not won 
acceptance in Australia or the United Kingdom. In Space Investments Ltd v Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co,193 Lord Templeman speculated about what 
would happen if it was impossible for the beneficiaries to trace misappropriated trust 
moneys into any particular asset in the context of a trustee who was a bank and had used 
all of the deposit moneys for the general purposes of the bank. Lord Templeman 
indicated that the beneficiaries would be able to trace into all of the assets of the bank 
and would be entitled to an equitable charge over all of the assets of the bank. As well 
they would be entitled to priority over the unsecured creditors who were considered to 
have voluntarily assumed the risk. It was even suggested that a lien could be imposed 
over the assets even where it could be demonstrated that the bank had dissipated the 
                                                 
187  See for example Hagan v Waterhouse (1993) 34 NSWLR 308, 357 (Kearney J); Re Global 
Finance Group Ltd [2002] WASC 63, [243] and [251]; Re French Caledonian Travel [2003] 
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190  The Law Society of Upper Canada v Toronto - Dominion Bank (1999) 169 DLR (4th) 353. 
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funds belonging to the beneficiaries.194 However, it was not necessary to apply this 
approach in Space Investments, as there was an express term in the trust instrument 
which permitted the trustee to treat the money notionally deposited, as if the trustee was 
beneficially entitled to the money. The claim of the new trustee was treated as that of an 
unsecured creditor, which ranked pari passu with that of the other unsecured creditors 
and this was rationalised on the basis that the seller had accepted the risk of insolvency 
by allowing the trustee to treat the funds as if the funds were the trustee’s own money. 
 
The approach outlined by Lord Templeman in Space Investments has not been endorsed 
in subsequent judicial statements in the United Kingdom and it is yet to find any support 
in Australian cases.195 In El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc196 Millett J indicated his 
approval for such an approach, and in principle was prepared to impose a lien even 
although it was not possible to identify the claimant’s money in bank accounts mixed 
with other moneys by application of the traditional rules and presumptions.  On the 
other hand, the Privy Council in Re Goldcorp Exchange197 rejected the broad approach 
of Lord Templeman in Space Investments, deciding that it would not overcome: ‘the 
difficulty that the moneys said to be impressed with the trust were paid into an 
overdrawn account and thereupon ceased to exist’.198 It has also been confirmed by the 
English Court of Appeal in Bishopsgate Investments Ltd v Hoaman199that moneys 
misapplied cannot be pursued through an overdrawn and therefore non-existent fund. In 
that case Leggatt LJ regarded Space Investments as ‘authority for no wider proposition 
than that where a bank trustee wrongly deposits money with itself, the trustee is able to 
trace into all the bank’s credit balances’.200
 
[306] Developments in relation to defences to claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
and breach of trust 
There is an extensive range of defences which are frequently raised in an effort to defeat 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust. There are some specific 
developments and possible future developments that will be highlighted here, although 
like other parts of this lecture, it is not intended to be a comprehensive review of those 
defences and the requirements which have to be satisfied in order to establish the 
particular defences.  
 
Acquiescence and laches are frequently raised as defences to such claims, and much 
confusion arises from the different senses in which these words are used, in what one 
Judge has described as a: ‘vague area of equity doctrine’.201  The various senses in 
which these words can be used were spelt out by Deane J in Orr v Ford.202 This 
judgment has, perhaps, been overlooked in subsequent cases, and it is worth drawing 
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attention to it, because it contains a useful analysis and clarification of the scope of 
these defences. In addition, Deane J also drew attention to the fact that scope exists for 
doctrine to be unified in the context of these defences, instead of having to raise 
particular species of these defences, and having to satisfy the particular requirement for 
that particular species. Such unification may be possible within the framework of 
estoppel by conduct, whereby relief in equity would be precluded: ‘where the 
enforcement of rights would be unconscionable’.203  To date the High Court has not 
endorsed such an approach, although as will be made apparent in a moment, such an 
approach may be implicit in the adoption of the defence of change of position, which is 
based upon inequitable circumstances, particularly detrimental outcomes not dissimilar 
to detrimental reliance which underpins the doctrine of estoppel.204
 
There is now scope for the defence of change of position to be applied in both personal 
and proprietary claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust in Australia and 
the United Kingdom. In considering this defence, it needs to be placed in the context of 
the acceptance of the defence of change position as a defence in claims in restitution 
based on unjust enrichment, and in which the defence is being developed on a case by 
case basis. The High Court, in accepting that such a defence could be raised in a 
restitution claim in David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia205 
identified the central element as that of: ‘the defendant having acted to his or her 
detriment on the faith of the receipt’.206 In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords 
approved of the introduction of the defence in Lipkin v Karpanale Ltd207 and indicated 
that the defence was available: ‘to a person whose position has so changed that it would 
be inequitable in all the circumstances to require him to make restitution, or 
alternatively to require him to make restitution, or alternatively to make full 
restitution’.208 Since then, the courts in England and Australia have been developing the 
defence on a case by case basis in restitution claims. An analysis of those developments 
is outside the scope of this lecture and the comments which follow are confined to a 
consideration of the extent to which there is scope for the defence to be relied upon as a 
defence to a proprietary claim in equity arising out of a breach of trust or breach of 
fiduciary duty, particularly where it is sought to sustain such a claim against a third 
party. Some reference will also be made to the scope for this defence to be raised in 
personal liability claims against recipients and accessories.  
 
In Queensland, the defence of change of position was introduced by statute in relation to 
breach of trust claims, long before the defence was judicially accepted as a defence in 
restitution claims. The defence is provided for by s 109(3) of the Trusts Act 1973 and 
this section was probably introduced in response to the efforts of the court in Diplock, in 
seeking a find a way to respond to the inequitable circumstances faced by the innocent 
volunteers against whom it was sought to maintain a proprietary claim in respect of the 
wrongful distribution of property in the administration of a deceased estate. The section 
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applies generally to the wrongful distribution of trust property and not only to the 
distribution of the estate of a deceased person and the use of the phrase ‘any remedy’ is 
wide enough to encompass both personal and proprietary remedies, so that the defence 
may be raised by a third party in response to both personal and proprietary claims. In 
other states where such legislation does not exist, it may be still possible for an innocent 
volunteer to raise the defence in proprietary claims based on breach of trust, as for 
example occurred in Gertsch v Atsas,209 where Foster AJ allowed the defence to be 
raised and made a determination on the basis of weighing up the advantages and 
disadvantages accruing to the recipient of the money. 
 
In Lipkin, the House of Lords appears to have also cleared the way for the defence to 
emerge in relation to proprietary claims whether advanced at law or in equity, without 
however supplanting the defence of the bona fide purchaser. According to Lord Goff, 
the adoption of the defence of change of position: ‘will enable a more generous 
approach to be taken to the recognition of the right of restitution; in the knowledge that 
the defence in appropriate cases is available’.210  It was subsequently acknowledged by 
Millett LJ in Boscawen v Bajwa211 that the introduction of the defence will also enable: 
‘a re-examination of many decision of the past in which the absence of the defence may 
have led judges to distort basic principles to avoid injustice to the defendant’.212 This is 
an obvious reference to Diplock.  There seems no doubt that the difficulties which arose 
in that case will now, in the absence any statutory provision like that which exists in 
Queensland, be able to be determined in the United Kingdom by application of the 
defence of change of position. This may mean some other aspects of Diplock may need 
to be reconsidered, particularly the refusal to allow funds to be traced in some of the 
instances that were considered in Diplock and in which the denial of tracing was said to 
depend upon the inequitable impact of tracing upon the innocent volunteer. It would 
now be a matter of deciding whether those circumstances were sufficiently inequitable 
so as to enable the volunteer to rely on the defence of change of position and if not, 
tracing might now be possible in some situations rejected in Diplock. 
 
There is a further issue that arises as a consequence of the acceptance of the defence of 
change of position, and that is the extent to which it may be possible for a third party to 
raise the defence in response to a receipt or accessory personal liability claim. Such a 
defence does not fit well in relation to these claims, as the requirements are currently 
framed in terms of knowledge, whereas the defence of change of position is based on an 
innocent change of position based on the receipt of the monies.213 However, as 
previously mentioned, there are those who advocate the adoption of a strict liability 
approach in receipt based claims subject to a defence of change of position. Accessory 
liability would remain outside of this framework and would depend upon the 
establishment of dishonest assistance in the breach of duty. 
 
One further matter which is worth mentioning in the context of defences, is that of the 
response of the judiciary to clauses in trust instruments, seeking to exonerate trustees 
from liability for breach of trust. In Australia, the courts have generally adopted a 
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narrow construction in relation to such clauses. Exemptions have been denied when 
trustees have acted dishonestly and preferred their own interests.214 In Minter Ellison v 
Perpetual Trustee WA Ltd,215 the conduct of the solicitors as trustee was not such that 
they had acted in good faith because they acted consciously and deliberately in 
preferring the interests of their client and had paid no heed to their trust duties. 
Moreover, the court may also prevent a trustee from relying on an exemption clause if it 
is satisfied that it would be unconscionable or unconscientious for a trustee to rely on 
the clause. Such a finding was made in one case, in circumstances where a firm of 
solicitors was aware of their obligations and was responsible for misleading 
correspondence so that other parties would not become aware of the breaches.216
 
In the case of Armitage v Nurse,217 decided in the United Kingdom, the court had to 
consider the effect of a clause which exonerated trustee from their ‘own actual fraud’. 
This was construed to mean dishonesty, as distinct from constructive or equitable or 
fraud, so as to connote: ‘an intention on the part of the trustee to pursue a particular 
course of action either knowing that it is contrary to the interests of  the beneficiaries or 
being recklessly indifferent whether it is contrary to their interests or not’.218 In another 
English case, the test of dishonesty as applied in the accessory liability cases was 
adopted for the purpose of construing an exemption clause which limited liability to 
dishonesty.219 Again in the case of Allan v Rea Brothers Trustee Ltd,220 Robert Walker 
LJ in considering the effect of an exemption clause which excluded the trustees’ 
liability for ‘wilful and individual fraud or wrongdoing’, decided that any breaches of 
the trustee’s duty did not come within any ‘measurable distance as amounting to wilful 
and individual fraud or wrongdoing’.221
 
It may be that the courts will also need to turn their minds to the permissible scope of 
such exemption clauses and place limits on the extent to which it is permissible to 
exclude liability. In Armitage v Nurse,222 Millett LJ reflected on the permitted scope of 
such clauses, and indicated that an exemption clause could exclude liability for wilful 
default as well as for ordinary negligence and want of probity as well as gross 
negligence.  However, Millett LJ went on to suggest that: ‘there is an irreducible core of 
obligations owed by trustees to the beneficiaries and enforceable by them which is the 
fundamental concept of a trust’223 and in the absence of which there are no trusts. The 
minimum necessary and sufficient to give substance to the trusts was, in the opinion of 
Millett LJ: ‘the duty of the trustee to perform the trusts honestly and in good faith for 
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the benefit of the beneficiaries’.224 He did not include the duties of skill, prudence and 
diligence on the grounds that it was ‘Too late to suggest that the exclusion of liability 
for ordinary negligence or want of probity is contrary to public policy’.225 Milett LJ also 
drew our attention to the fact that it is now widely acknowledged that such clauses have 
gone too far, and that in particular, professional trustees who charge for their services 
should not be able to rely on exemption clauses to exclude liability for gross negligence. 
Perhaps there is a greater willingness on the part of the Australian judiciary to restrict 
the operation of such clauses or to deny them operation on the basis of 
unconscionability. In some jurisdictions, legislation has been introduced to deny the 
effect of exemption clauses, as for example, in Jersey, where a law was introduced in 
1989 which prevents an exemption clause from operating, which purports to absolve a 
trustee from liability for his own fraud, wilful misconduct or gross negligence. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
By way of conclusion to this lecture, I would like to offer some comments in the form 
of an evaluation of the developments which have occurred in equitable relief for breach 
of fiduciary duty and breach of trust which I have highlighted in this lecture.  These 
comments are made against the background of the comparative perspective which I 
have adopted in outlining those developments. 
 
1. The attempts which have been made in some jurisdictions to expand the role of 
fiduciary obligations for the purpose of protecting individual and social interests 
should continue to be resisted in this country, so that the subordination of self 
interest should continue to be reflected in liabilities arising on the basis of 
conflict of duty and interest, misuse of a fiduciary position, undue influence and 
confidentiality. Other avenues may be available, and other rationales may well 
provide a basis for intervention without the need to resort to expanding the 
function served by the obligation of loyalty as currently understood in the 
Australian context. 
2. Notwithstanding what has been suggested in the previous paragraph, there is 
clearly scope for the currently accepted fiduciary duties to arise in the context of 
a more extensive array of relationships, outside of the well established 
categories of such relationships. This is particularly so in relation to professional 
advisory relationships. There is now greater scope for this to occur on the basis 
of the court finding that there is a legitimate expectation of an undertaking to act 
in the best interests of another party to the relationship or some third party. 
3. The obligation to avoid conflicts of duty and duty, has gained more prominence 
in claims for breach of fiduciary duty in litigation against lawyers and it has also 
become apparent that this duty may also arise in the context of other advisory 
relationships. This obligation embraces situations involving the simultaneous 
representation of clients in the same matter and successive representation in 
separate matters. In same matter conflicts, the courts should be willing to 
intervene whenever it is demonstrated that it is impossible for a lawyer to act 
fairly for both parties.  When acting against a former client, the case for a very 
strict approach is clearly required so as to place the onus on the lawyer to 
demonstrate that there is no risk of disclosure of confidential information. In the 
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last instance, the courts should continue to insist that it is up to the lawyer to 
demonstrate that effective means are in place to prevent disclosure from 
occurring, although it is probably not necessary to go so far as to adopt an 
irrebuttable presumption in such instances as has occurred in some jurisdictions. 
In addition, one should also not loose sight of the additional obligations which 
attach to a lawyer and others such as financial advisers when undertaking an 
advisory role. 
4. A trustee in exercise of a duty of care, owed in relation to the management and 
administration of a trust, is not required to simply act as an ordinary business 
person. It is sometimes overlooked in formulations of this duty, that the trustee 
is unlike an ordinary business person, in that the trustee does have to take 
account of the interests of the beneficiaries to whom the obligation is owed. The 
duty of care is therefore coloured by the fiduciary standard which may prevent 
the duty from being completely assimilated with a common law duty of care. 
The expectations of trustees and the responsibilities of trustees are manifestly 
different to those of an ordinary business person. Moreover, there should also be 
general acceptance that a higher duty of care applies to professional trustees and 
trust corporations by reason of special skill and care which such trustees profess 
to have and that liabilities should arise when the trustees conduct falls below 
such a standard of care. 
5. It is suggested that in recipient liability personal claims against third parties for 
breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty, the liability has a proprietary 
rationale and is therefore receipt based and not fault based. There is therefore no 
place for dishonesty or want of probity as a basis for liability in respect of such 
claims. There is a clear need for the courts to settle on an agreed approach in 
relation to such claims, and if knowledge is to be an essential ingredient, then all 
levels of knowledge should suffice. However, a good case can be made out for 
the abandonment of knowledge altogether as a requirement, and instead for 
liability to be strict, but subject to a defence of change of position. 
6. There is also a clear need for the courts to settle upon an agreed approach in 
relation to accessory liability personal claims against third parties for breach of 
trust and breach of fiduciary duty. Unlike a recipient claim, the liability does not 
depend upon the receipt of property and it seems to be now accepted that 
liability is fault based. It is a matter of settling on what will constitute fault in 
this context. Should it be knowledge based or should it depend upon some form 
of dishonesty? It would seem that it is likely for the time being at least, to be 
based on dishonesty, although not confined to being an accessory to dishonest 
and fraudulent conduct on the part of the party primarily liable. If this is to be 
the approach, then it should have a strong objective element and not left to be 
determined on the basis of the subjective moral standards of the individual. The 
time is long overdue for the High Court to re-examine both recipient and 
accessory liability, should an appropriate opportunity arise. 
7. In the case of both breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the 
remedies available for the purpose of redressing the breach are to a large extent 
discretionary, except perhaps in instances where the plaintiff succeeds on the 
basis of an existing proprietary right, although even in such instances 
discretionary factors are brought into play when deciding if the defendant is able 
to rely upon a defence to defeat the claim.  It is for the court to determine the 
appropriate remedies which will depend largely on the circumstances of the 
particular case. In these cases, the court has available to it the full armoury of 
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both personal and proprietary remedies. The remedial responses and the range of 
considerations which come into play are often very different to those which 
determine relief at common law. Restoration is a key feature of relief in these 
claims and punishment has generally not been part of the equation. 
8. The adoption in Australia of a more flexible approach in relation the award of 
proprietary relief for the recovery of profits, gains and benefits derived in breach 
of fiduciary duty, is a sensible development. The award of proprietary relief is 
no longer automatic and in many instances it will be unnecessary or 
inappropriate. Personal remedies will in many instances provide adequate relief, 
although the remedial constructive trust may, if necessary, be declared enabling 
the court to shape the relief to avoid injustice to third parties. The courts are also 
mindful of the need to avoid unjust enrichments to the plaintiff when calculating 
profits, benefits or gains or when assessing losses for the purpose of equitable 
compensation. Fiduciary liability should be regarded as based on its own well 
established principles, and it is therefore suggested that it is somewhat 
misleading to describe that liability in terms of constructive trusteeship, as there 
are no loner any automatic proprietary consequences, in the absence of any 
existing equitable interest in the property in question. The developments which 
have taken place in relation to proprietary relief for breach of fiduciary duty 
should serve as a signal that a constructive trust should also no longer 
automatically arise the moment a bribe is received by a fiduciary. There should 
remain scope for proprietary relief in such instances, but on the basis of the 
flexible considerations, which prevail when a remedial constructive trust is 
applied. 
9. The emergence in Australia of equitable compensation as a remedy not only for 
losses arising from breach of trust but also for relief arising from a breach of 
fiduciary duty and for breach of other equitable duties including equitable duties 
of care, is a significant and important development in relation to the relief that is 
available in response to such claims. As a result of this development, issues have 
arisen about causation and contributory responsibility for the purpose of 
apportioning losses in such instances. The courts have and should continue to 
attach particular importance to the obligation of defaulting trustees and other 
fiduciaries to make restitution as an aspect of the very high standards of conduct 
expected of such people. For that reason, the courts should tread carefully when 
called upon to adopt common law notions for the assessment of equitable 
compensation, and it may be that judges should not too readily speculate about 
what might have happened if the duty had been fulfilled.  Even in relation to 
equitable duties of care owed by trustees and other fiduciaries, the standard of 
care is readily coloured by the fiduciary standard to protect the interests of 
another and it may be that common law notions derived from contract and tort 
are not necessarily appropriate for the purpose of the assessing quantum of 
equitable compensation for breach for an equitable duty of care. On the other 
hand, it may be permissible for the courts to insist on an adequate or sufficient 
connection between the breach and the loss in respect of which compensation is 
sought. There are also still severe conceptual difficulties preventing the 
acceptance of notions of contributory negligence, for the purpose of 
apportioning awards of compensation, although it may still be possible to reach 
similar results by means of awards of counter restitution in favour of the 
defendant and by application of established equitable defences. There is also a 
very strong inclination in Australia to resist the introduction of exemplary 
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damages in breach of fiduciary duty claims, although convincing reasons have 
been advanced for not regarding equitable compensation as indicative of the 
limits of monetary relief available in equity in a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
Even so, the award of such relief would be restricted to very exceptional kinds 
of cases. 
10. It is suggested that the Australian courts, unlike their British counterparts, 
should avoid the temptation to restrict proprietary claims in equity within the 
straight jacket of an existing equitable proprietary interest, with the result that in 
England it is still necessary to find a fiduciary relationship in order to invoke the 
rules and presumptions developed in equity for the purpose of following and 
tracing property. There should remain scope for proprietary relief even although 
the claim is not advanced on the basis of an existing equitable proprietary right, 
and it should still be possible in such instances to enable the claimant to invoke 
the rules and presumptions developed by equity for the purpose of following and 
tracing property as part of the process of identifying the subject matter of the 
proprietary claim. In addition, it is also suggested that there is no logical 
justification for any longer, maintaining different rules for the purpose of tracing 
property at law or in equity. This produces capricious results in the case of 
mixed funds, and hence the result should be the same irrespective of whether the 
proprietary claim is characterised as a legal or an equitable claim. 
11. There is need for flexibility in the utilisation of the process of tracing, and it has 
been demonstrated how the courts in different jurisdictions have responded to 
this need in the context of mixed funds made up of many contributors. On the 
other hand, there has been a very marked reluctance on the part of the judiciary, 
particularly in the United Kingdom, to adopt other tracing approaches to enable 
a claimant to recover property when the claimant is unable to identify specific 
property by application of the established rules for following and tracing trust 
property. The established principles and presumptions are clearly in need of re-
examination in the context of much more sophisticated business, fiscal and 
investment transactions, which now very often take place internationally and by 
means of the electronic transfer of funds. The rules and presumptions were 
developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century and in the early part of the 
twentieth century in the context of family trusts, and, as such, are not adequate 
for dealing with fraud in the context of the rapid expansion and 
internationalisation of business, and the very substantial amounts of funds that 
may be involved. 
12. There is scope for a more unified approach to be adopted in relation to the 
defences based on equitable doctrines, such as laches and acquiescence rather 
than continuing to deal with such defences on the basis of their own specific 
requirements. This has gained added momentum by reason of the introduction of 
the defence of change of position, based on inequitable circumstances, 
particularly detrimental reliance. There is therefore, a role for unconscionability 
doctrine in this context. 
13. The defence of change of position is now clearly available in relation to both 
proprietary and personal claims, although it has not, and nor should it supplant 
the defence of the bona fide purchaser, or the registration provisions of 
legislative enactments such as the Land Transfer Act. The bona fide purchaser, 
marks the limits of proprietary relief and the limits of personal recipient liability, 
and it has already been suggested above, that personal recipient liability ought to 
be strict, but subject to a defence of change of position. In respect of personal 
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accessory liability claims, it may be that there is no scope for a defence of 
change of position, given that liability is likely to depend on proof of dishonesty. 
In the past, the absence of any defence of change of position may have led the 
courts to deny the availability of the process of tracing in some situations, in 
order to produce just outcomes for innocent volunteers. It is no longer necessary 
to do this, now that a volunteer is able to raise such a defence. It may be that a 
claimant will be able to identify the property claimed to greater extent that might 
otherwise have been thought possible when seeking to trace funds wrongly 
distributed to an innocent volunteer. In order to resist the claim, the volunteer 
must now not only be able to demonstrate inequitable circumstances, but must 
also be able to demonstrate that those inequitable circumstances satisfy the 
requirements which have to be satisfied in order to make out a defence of change 
of position. 
14. The courts should continue to scrutinise exemption clauses very closely and 
more attention should be given to determining the permissible scope of such 
clauses. There is much to be said for the view that there is an irreducible core of 
obligation, which is fundamental to trust and other fiduciary relationships 
without which, there would be no trust. The fiduciary standard which requires 
the fiduciary not to act out of self interest lies at the heart of such relationships. 
In particular, professional trustees who charge for their services should not be 
able too readily to avoid their obligations. Unconscionability doctrine may have 
a role to play here, as may legislative intervention.  
15. Finally, the use of the terminology of constructive trust and constructive 
trusteeship has been deliberately avoided in this lecture, except in the context of 
the constructive trust as a proprietary remedy. These terms are often used when 
referring to various aspects of liabilities for breach of fiduciary duty, including 
the personal lability of recipients and accessories. There may be no proprietary 
connotations when used in such contexts. This only causes confusion and it is 
suggested that as a result of the developments discussed in this lecture, that the 
use of this terminology should be abandoned, as one is able to isolate the 
principles which determine liability for breach of fiduciary duty, including the 
principles which determine the personal liabilities of third parties from the 
principles which govern relief for breach of fiduciary duty and the related third 
party liabilities. It is no longer necessary to pretend that this topic is about 
constructive trusts or constructive trusteeship. It is, to a large extent, about 
personal obligations as they affect the party with primary responsibility, as well 
as the impact of those obligations on third parties for the purpose of determining 
the personal liabilities of third parties.  It is then possible to regard the remedial 
framework when it is brought into operation for redressing such breaches, as a 
separate issue, without any automatic assumption that the relief will need to be 
proprietary in its consequences. Nevertheless, within that remedial framework, 
there is scope for both personal and proprietary remedies to be invoked, 
although the courts will more often than not prefer to award a personal remedy 
rather than a proprietary remedy. The proprietary remedy will always be 
dependent upon the existence of identifiable subject matter against which the 
remedy is able to operate with proprietary consequences.   In addition, it may 
also be possible to sustain a proprietary claim on the basis of an equitable 
proprietary right, or perhaps even on the basis of an unconscionable denial of a 
beneficial interest, which then enables the process of following and tracing to be 
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invoked for the purpose of identifying the continued existence of the property as 
the subject matter of a proprietary claim. 
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